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LAYERS OF THE LAW:  A LOOK AT THE ROLE OF LAW 
IN JAPAN TODAY 
Andrew M. Pardieck
†
 
Abstract: In 1967, Professor Kawashima wrote about a world of vaguely defined 
rights and norms in Japan.  This article argues that world still exists.  But it now co-exists 
with a world that commonly defines rights, in great detail, and regularly invokes them.  
There are layers of the law in Japan.  Primary ordering of relationships and services is 
often based on complex, legalistic contracts and regulation; secondary ordering is often 
based on equity, Japanese notions of equity.  
Examples from contract, employment, and environmental law and practice illustrate 
this.  For each, this paper examines both sides of the coin—transactional ordering and 
litigated outcomes.  Leases may be so detailed that they address liability for a broken 
toilet paper holder.  Yet, if challenged in court, leases may be re-written to reflect current 
economic circumstances or the “consensus of society.”  Employment contracts may start 
with indemnification requirements and end with termination rights, but if they are 
litigated, the courts will look for just cause.  Volumes of regulation govern when a 
nuclear reactor may operate, but the final decision is based on a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
and local consensus.    
As a result, negotiation occurs first in the shadow of detailed rights and obligations, 
and, if contested, then in the shadow of law, equity, and local consensus.  The role of law 
in Japan has changed enormously since 1967, and will change in the decades to come, but 
an accurate description of what it is now starts with Professor Kawashima’s discussion of 
vaguely-defined rights and an understanding of the layers of the law described in this 
paper.    
                                                     
†
 Andrew M. Pardieck, Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.  
With thanks to the participants at the Festschrift Conference in Honor of Professor John O. Haley, and in 
particular, Professors John Haley, Mark Ramseyer, and Mark Levin for their helpful comments and 
suggestions.  Professors Nobuhisa Segawa, Luke Nottage, and Trevor Ryan also graciously offered their 
time and suggestions.  Any errors or omissions are solely mine.  Translations are mine where English 
language sources are unavailable.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
What is the role of law in a society where a residential lease contract 
is so involved that it addresses toilet paper holders and shower hoses, yet an 
unwritten “gentlemen’s agreement” governs operation of a nuclear power 
plant?  What is the role of law in a society where fifty-page contracts 
governing employee relationships ignore decades of clearly established law?  
How does one make sense of law in a society with a rapidly declining 
general population and a rapidly increasing population of legal 
professionals, or one with increasingly broad application of criminal law and 
a decreasing prosecution rate? 
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The writings on law and society in Japan are voluminous, but none 
adequately answer these questions and describe the Japan that exists today.  
One can’t ride the subways in Japan now without seeing advertisements for 
attorneys.  One can’t watch the news without hearing of Japanese who are 
no longer willing to wait for or trust the government.  One can’t sign a lease 
or a services contract without sensing a gap between the academic literature 
and the Japan that exists today.  Working, living, or even visiting Japan 
leaves one with the visceral sense that law in Japan is changing.  This article 
looks to explain some of those changes and proposes a different framework 
for understanding the role that law plays in Japan today.       
It does so by addressing both public and private law subjects and 
examining both sides of the legal coin—transactional issues as well as 
dispute resolution.  Doing so suggests an explanation for how law functions 
in Japan that differs from those offered by Professors Kawashima, Haley, 
Ramseyer, and others who have commented on the “legal consciousness” 
(hō ishiki) of the Japanese.   
In 1967, Professor Kawashima published his work on the legal 
consciousness of the Japanese, Nihonjin no Hōishiki, and it has been the 
subject of debate since.
1
  Despite wide criticism, it remains relevant—in 
part.  Professor Kawashima described a “pre-modern legal consciousness” in 
Japan that created a rift between Japan’s modern codes, particularly the Civil 
Code, and the world in which most Japanese lived.
2
  He pointed to a 
fundamental “gap” between “law at the normative level” and “law at the 
[black] letter level.”3   The Japanese, according to Professor Kawashima, 
have a weak sense of individual rights.
4
  While rights under modern law are 
based on objective standards defined at the level of the individual, Japanese 
norms “compromise towards reality.”5  He points repeatedly to rights that 
“exist but don’t exist” (aru yō na/nai yō na).6 
                                                     
1
  See TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI iv (1967) [hereinafter KAWASHIMA, 
NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI].  Professor Kawashima published a second, revised edition in 1987.  Id.  Professors 
Feldman and Nottage have both summarized and reflected on this debate.  See generally Eric A. Feldman, 
Law, Culture, and Conflict: Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50 
(Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007); Luke Nottage, The Cultural (Re)Turn in Japanese Law Studies, 39 VICTORIA 
U. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 755, 761-766 (2008).  See also Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The 
Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn To Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 33-36 
(2006).       
2
  KAWASHIMA NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 4-5.  
3
  Id. at 197-98. 
4
  See id. at 15, 17, 19, 29.  No term for “rights” even existed prior to the Meiji Reformation.  Id. at 
16.  
5
  Id. at 22-29. 
6
  Id. at 93, 104, 116, 139, 151. 
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According to Professor Kawashima, while modern Japanese property 
law recognizes comprehensive and exclusive ownership rights, traditional 
Japan does not.
7
  Urban Japanese leasing storage space in rural villages 
during World War II found farmers wearing their clothing and using the 
items being “stored.”8  While modern contract law is premised on clear, 
specific definitions of rights and obligations, Japanese practice is based on 
informal agreements “where there is and there isn’t a contract,” and “where 
there is and there isn’t a promise.”9  Storeowners who refuse to take back a 
purchased item are “rigid and heartless.”10  A government purchaser is a 
superior party and expected to be receptive to entreaties by an inferior 
contractor to modify the contract.
11
  Promises are dependent on 
relationships,
12
 and the contracts that result are indefinite, with “tentative” 
(ichō) rights and liabilities.13   
Professor Kawashima described dispute resolution in similar terms.  
While courts find facts and clearly define rights, the Japanese prefer rights 
and obligations that “exist but don’t exist.”14  In conciliation, rights and 
obligations are tentative and those unwilling to give ground heartless and 
unyielding.
15
  The goal is “a rounded resolution” (maruku osameru), without 
a determination of rights, which preserves the relationship and community.
16
   
Professor Kawashima also predicted change.  He predicted an increase 
in rights consciousness, leading to an increase in litigation.
17
  He anticipated 
an increase in appeals to “legal standards,” an increase in demand for 
authoritative decisions defining clear, fixed rights, and notions of individual 
equality taking precedent over social relationships.
18
  
Many have taken exception to Professor Kawashima’s description, in 
particular, his suggestion of a cultural proclivity for conciliation rather than 
litigation and a cultural preference for vague agreements over clear 
contracts.  Professor Haley came first, suggesting that there is no evidence 
                                                     
7
  Id. at 66-69, 73. 
8
 Id. 
9
  Id. at 87, 93. 
10
  Id. at 94.  An urban housewife who criticizes a farmer for selling potatoes that were promised to 
her to another “lacks common sense.”  A promise is a promise but it depends on the relationship.  If it’s 
between relatives or people of the same village, it is given greater weight.  Id. at 92.   
11
  Id. at 1-2, 107, 116. 
12
  Id.  
13
  Id.  The Japanese avoided specific, definite contracts because they precluded “flexibility” (yūtsū), 
“entreaty” (kongan), and “favor” (onkei).  Id. at 117. 
14
  Id. at 139. 
15
  Id. at 151.   
16
  Id. at 160, 167. 
17
  Id. at 186. 
18
  Id. at 187-88, 197. 
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that the Japanese have a cultural aversion to litigation causing them to accept 
mediated settlements less beneficial than judicial outcomes.
19
  Surveys of 
Japanese suggest a willingness to sue, and surveys of Japanese history 
suggest a pattern of litigation.
20
  The difference in post-World War II Japan 
is institutional incapacity.  While there are social organizations conducive to 
informal dispute resolution, there is not meaningful access to the courts.
21
   
Professor Ramseyer has suggested that neither primacy of culture nor 
primacy of costs explain low litigation rates in Japan.
22
  According to 
Professor Ramseyer, “the popular notion that the Japanese behave in ways 
uncorrelated to judicial outcomes is flatly false.”23  According to Professor 
Ramseyer, empirical evidence on litigation rates and settlement verdicts for 
automobile accidents demonstrates a decreased need for formal judicial 
process.
24
  Japanese settle disputes in light of readily predictable litigation 
outcomes.
25
  They bargain in the shadow of the law, and they do so because 
of efficiency, not inefficiency, in the formal process.
26
   
Other Japanese law scholars have built on this discussion.  Some have 
offered “a political perspective.” 27   Professor Upham, reviewing the 
government’s attempts to resolve the pollution cases of the 1960s and 1970s, 
suggested that the Japanese State encouraged mediation and conciliation as a 
means to control disputes.
28
  Professor Tanase analyzed automobile accident 
                                                     
19
  John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUDIES 359, 366-367 (1978). 
20
  Id. at 368; see also JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADOX 83 (1994); CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868 80-107 (E.J. Brill ed., 
1991).  Both discuss extensive litigation during the Ashikaga and Tokugawa periods, as well as the early 
Showa era. 
21
  Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, supra note 19, at 379-80.  Professor Haley cites to 
bond-posting requirements, filing costs, clogged courts, and a lack of remedies, as discouraging use of 
formal process, while the effectiveness of third-party intervention lessens the need.  Id. at 378-87. 
22
  J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict 
Rates in Japan, XVIII J. LEGAL. STUD. 263, 267-68 (1989) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Nakazato, The 
Rational Litigant Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan]. 
23
  J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH XVII 
(1999) [hereinafter RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH].  
24
  Ramseyer & Nakazato, The Rational Litigant Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 
supra note 22, at 280-81, 289-90.  Professor Foote has suggested generalization based on traffic accident 
data is “dangerous.”  See generally Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and Judicial 
Activism in Japan, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 19 (1995).  Professor Ramseyer has argued broader applicability.  See 
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Effect of Universal Health Insurance on Malpractice Claims: The Japanese 
Experience, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 621, 656 n. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Ramseyer, The Effect of Universal 
Health Insurance on Malpractice Claims]. 
25
  See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 23, at 92-95. 
26
  See id.  Professor Ramseyer points to the absence of juries, a judiciary that prizes uniformity and 
applies a national body of law, and judges who signal likely outcomes over discontinuous trial sessions and 
use detailed, public formula to calculate damages, as all contributing to settlement of claims.  See id. 
27
  Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 36; Nottage, supra note 1, at 764.  
28
  FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 53-66 (1987).  Professor Upham 
describes, inter alia, the attempts by local and national governments to force mediation between Chisso 
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compensation and found management of disputes by the Japanese elite in 
order to maintain low levels of litigation and insulate the government from 
challenge.
29
  
More recently, Professors Ginsburg and Hoetker reviewed these 
theories in light of statistics showing a “stark” increase in litigation in the 
1990s.
30
  They found the increase attributable to procedural reforms, the 
expansion of the Japanese judiciary and bar, and economic change following 
the collapse of Japan’s economic bubble. 31   In other words, culture and 
predictability did not change; the economy and the institutional incapacity 
cited by Professor Haley did.  Easier access to the courts and economic bad 
times account for the stark increase in litigation.    
What all of this misses, at least in describing the Japan of today, is 
evidence suggesting that Professor Kawashima’s traditional world of weak 
rights and ambiguous norms still exists; but it co-exists with a complex, 
almost hyper-legal society.  Shifting the focus from culture to rights suggests 
there are layers of the law in Japan.  The layers start with formal ordering 
that precisely defines rights and duties on an individual level:  residential 
leases address minutiae, and volumes of public regulation detail when a 
nuclear power plant may operate.
32
  Secondary ordering, however, 
circumscribes that formal order.  It does so by incorporating traditional 
notions of equity, Professor Kawashima’s rights that “exist but don’t exist.”  
Judicial decisions rewrite leases based on fairness and current economic 
circumstances, and operating decisions for nuclear power plants are based on 
local consensus.
33
  Vaguely defined norms still exist, and are often 
dispositive, but they come into play after navigating detailed legal norms.  
Concrete norms define the territory, but, if challenged, they often give way 
to vague norms that define an equitable outcome.
34
  As a result, negotiation 
occurs not in the shadow of the law, but in the shadow of private ordering 
                                                                                                                                                              
Corporation and those poisoned by the mercury it discharged into Minamata Bay.  Id.  After failed 
mediation and adverse court decisions, the national government established new compensation funds and 
new mediation and conciliation bodies to review environmental pollution cases, again removing the bulk of 
those cases from the court system.  Id. 
29
  Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 656-57 (1990).  According to Professor Tanase, the Japanese State controls 
demand for formal legal process without coercion by limiting its efficiency so that state-supported and 
private alternative dispute resolution becomes more attractive.  Id. 
30
  See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 25-27.  Statistics cited by Professors Ginsburg and 
Hoetker show a spike staring in 1992.  Id at 35.  Japan’s economic bubble burst in 1991.  See Sekai no 
Shuyou Kabushiki Shijou, ASAHI SHINBUM CHOKAN, Oct. 8, 1996, at 13.   
31
  See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 25-27. 
32
  See infra Parts II.B. & IV.A. 
33
  See infra Parts II.C. & IV.B. 
34
  See infra Parts II-IV. 
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based on a detailed enumeration of rights.  When that negotiation fails, 
appeals to vague rights, notions of fairness, and the “consensus of society” 
follow. 
The remainder of the article will support this discussion with 
specifics.  Parts II and III examine private law issues:  contract law and 
practice, followed by employment law and practice.  Part IV will address a 
public law subject, environmental law, and focus specifically on the 
regulation of nuclear power.  These subjects are addressed here for two 
reasons:  first, each subject has seen significant development in the law that 
warrants discussion; second, they collectively illustrate the layering of legal 
norms in Japan.  For each section, the discussion begins with a review of the 
transactional documents or public regulation that initially defines rights and 
obligations.  An examination of secondary ordering in the courts of law or 
public consensus follows.  The conclusion then briefly discusses other 
examples, including recent attempts to use contract law to deter crime.  
From contracts to crime, whether one examines private law or public law, 
one finds that Japan is a country now governed by layers of the law.    
II. CONTRACT LAW & PRACTICE IN JAPAN 
In thinking about contracting practice in Japan, Professor Kawashima 
again provides the starting point.  He suggests that oral agreements are 
common, and “even when written agreements are drafted their contents are 
generally very simple:”35 
When we compare this situation with the situation in European 
and American business transactions . . . where contractual rights 
and duties are set forth in detail “to the point of being 
permeated with minutiae” that provides for every possible 
contingency and where contracts are often printed in their full 
particulars in letters that are so small that one cannot read them 
without a magnifying glass, we can understand the very 
conspicuous Japanese peculiarity in this regard.
36
   
In Japan, Professor Kawashima observed “a tendency to avoid clarity and 
legally enforceable rights and duties with a concomitant desire to maintain 
flexibility in light of supervening events.” 37   His comments have been 
                                                     
35
  Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 15 
(1974). 
36
  Id. 
37
  John O. Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice and Law in Japan, 1 J. EAST ASIA AND INT’L L. 47, 
50 (2008). 
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echoed by some and challenged by others.
38
  Some practitioners have 
suggested that the Japanese are much more likely than U.S. parties to rely on 
oral agreements, and when there is a written agreement, it tends to be less 
detailed.
39
  Professors Uchida and Taylor state that an “axiomatic feature of 
‘Japanese contracts’ prior to the 1990s was the brevity and perfunctory 
language of contract documentation.”40 
Others have suggested that there is little difference between Japanese 
and Western contracting practice.  According to Professor Ramseyer, “[l]ike 
Jason and Freddie Krueger,” stereotypes about Japanese contracting practice 
“just will not die.  Unfortunately, even if not dead, most are dead wrong.”41  
Professor Ramseyer argues that the Japanese negotiate and write extensive 
contracts, and their contracts are not necessarily vague or necessarily short.
42
  
With professional judges and fewer choice of law issues, one might expect 
less specificity on the margins.
43
  But parties to repeat deals in Japan do 
specify the important terms.  Automobile manufacturers and suppliers will 
sign a “basic contract,” but this is followed by a host of documents 
specifying production schedules and the like.
44
  Professor Ramseyer argues 
that a two-tiered contracting scheme explains both the U.S. and Japan:  so 
long as the relationship continues, the parties structure their interaction by 
non-binding terms; however, all relationships end, so they also draft parallel, 
legally-enforceable contracts that govern the terms of their end game.
45
   
                                                     
38
  See, e.g., Young et al., Japanese Attitudes Towards Contracts: An Empirical Wrinkle in the 
Debate, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 789, 792 (2003). 
39
  See Evidence of Distinct Attitudes in Typical US and Japanese Contracts, in LAW AND 
INVESTMENT IN JAPAN 280-81 (Yanagida et al. eds. 2000); Carl J. Green, Japan: “The Rule of Law Without 
Lawyer” Reconsidered, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND 
COMMENTARY 179, 181-182 (2d ed. 2012). 
40
  Takashi Uchida & Veronica L. Taylor, Japan’s “Era of Contract,” in LAW IN JAPAN:  A TURNING 
POINT 472 (Daniel E. Foote ed., 2007).  Professor Foote explains this brevity in terms of “relational 
contracts.”  See Daniel E. Foote, Evolution in the Concept of Contracts, reprinted in LAW AND INVESTMENT 
IN JAPAN 293-98 (Yanagida et al. eds., 2000).  Attitudes towards contracts depend on the nature and 
duration of the relationship of the parties.  Id. at 468.  Japanese companies seek to develop a long-term 
stable relationship based on trust, and those long-term relationships obviate the need for long, extensive 
contracts.  Id.  Cross-shareholding between companies magnifies this trend, resulting in less need for 
detailed, specific contracts.  Id.  Companies operating outside of the cross-sharing holding relationship face 
reputational risk–the risk of alienating one company and burning several bridges, which again alleviates the 
need for complex contracts.  Id.  In comparison, Japanese companies are willing to, and do, demand 
complex, detailed contracts with foreign companies–those with whom they do not have a relationship, and 
who are not subject to the same kind of reputational risk.  See id. at 468; KENNETH PORT & GERALD 
MCALINN, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 458 (2003). 
41
  RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 23, at 61. 
42
  Id. at 62. 
43
  See id.  
44
  Id. 
45
  Id. at 65.  To prevent opportunistic behavior during the relationship, they rely on future profits and 
reputation.  See id.   
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A review of contracts obtained over the past several years suggests an 
element of truth in all of this discourse.
46
  Some contracts remain 
deceptively simple, providing no more than a bare-bones structure for the 
relationship.  Some contracts are remarkably detailed, “permeated with 
minutiae,” literally requiring a magnifying glass to read.  A review of both 
the contracts and recent case law suggests a two-tiered contracting scheme, 
but one different from that suggested by Professor Ramseyer.  The first tier 
is detailed and based on the specific terms of the contract.  When 
relationships end and the courts are involved, however, different norms 
apply:  not the detailed norms of the contract, but the vague norms of the 
court applying its own conception of equity.   
This section examines language from recent contracts: first those 
categorized here as “traditional” contracts because of their continued use of 
vaguely defined rights and obligations; and then those characterized as 
“modern” contracts because they define rights in remarkable detail.  A 
discussion of the courts’ re-interpretation of contracts in recent cases 
follows.    
A.   “Traditional Contracts”  
What Professor Kawashima would likely consider "traditional" 
contracts are still used today.  They cover only the most basic terms and 
leave a lot to the imagination.  One professionally prepared contract 
template for purchasing real property covers a little over a page and simply 
identifies the parties, price, earnest money, delivery, parcel to be delivered, 
costs of recording, risk of loss prior to delivery, and a right to terminate on 
breach of contract.
47
  Breach is not defined, no contingencies are covered, 
and there is no discussion of the method of payment or financing.
48
  There is 
no discussion of representations or disclosures; no discussion of inspections 
or access; no discussion of warranties, tax, or survey information.
49
    
One still sees traditional contracts for services, covering only the most 
basic terms, and intentionally incorporating ambiguity.  Parties will define 
basic obligations and the price, and then state that “with regard to 
compensation, where there are changes in the requested services established 
. . . or other change in circumstances, the parties . . . may, on consultation, 
                                                     
46
  The contracts were obtained from practitioners in Tokyo, consulting firms, and practice manuals.  
They include contracts for goods and services, lease agreements, employment contracts, and contracts for 
the sale of real property, used by companies ranging in size from small and medium-sized to multi-national.  
47
  Contract on file with author (Sept. 6, 2005), arts. 1-11.   
48
  Id. 
49
  Id. 
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change the compensation terms.”50  Leases often include similar language, 
stating that the parties may demand a change in rent during the contract term 
when it has become “inappropriate” (fusōtō) because of “an increase or 
decrease in taxes assessed on the land or building;” “an increase or decrease 
in the value of the land or building or other change in economic conditions;” 
or the rent has become unreasonable “when compared to rents charged for 
comparable buildings nearby.”51    
Leases often include vague statements prohibiting tenants from 
engaging in acts which “cause inconvenience” (meiwaku) to neighboring 
tenants or property holders, violation of which, at least on their face, provide 
grounds for terminating the contract.
52
  Contracts often include vague 
statements regarding compliance with the law
53
 and inevitably end with a 
general meet and confer provision:  the parties “will consult in good faith to 
devise a resolution when events not covered in this contract arise or when a 
conflict arises as to the interpretation or execution of this contract.”54   
B.  Modern Contracts  
These contracts stand in sharp contrast to others used today—
contracts that Professor Kawashima would describe as “permeated with 
minutiae that provides for every possible contingency.”55  In contrast to the 
bare-bones real estate contract referenced above, a residential lease now 
used by a large property management company in Tokyo contains pages 
assigning rights and liabilities for every contingency imaginable, including, 
for example, terms covering renters’ liability for damages, lessor’s 
disclaimers of liability, “prohibited acts,” early termination of the lease, 
termination prior to occupancy, conditions which void the contract, separate 
                                                     
50
  Contract on file with author (July 1, 2008), art. 2. 
51
  Contract on file with author (Mar. 15, 2012), art. 4(3) (1-3).  These clauses are based, in part, on 
the Doctrine of Changed Circumstances, which provides that “a contract party has the right to require an 
adjustment of the terms of the agreement or, if no mutual compromise can be reached, to rescind the 
contract where (1) there has been a change of circumstances, that (2) has occurred after the contract was 
concluded but prior to the time for performance, (3) could not have been foreseen by the parties, (4) is not 
attributable to the fault of either party, and (5) renders performance under the terms of the contract 
unconscionable.”  See Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice and Law in Japan, supra note 37, at 61.  These 
provisions were regularly invoked after March 11, 2011.  Interview with property manager (Tokyo 2012).  
Notes on file with author. 
52
  Contract on file with author (May 15, 2012), art. 10(2).  
53
  Contract on file with author (July 1, 2008), art. 8. 
54
  Contract on file with author.  Other language commonly used states, “[w]here no term is 
established in this contract, or where there is doubt regarding the interpretation of terms in this contract, 
[the parties] will confer in good faith and seek to resolve the issue smoothly.”  Contract on file with author 
(July 1, 2008), art. 8.  
55
  Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, supra note 35, at 15. 
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conditions for terminating the contract and surrendering the premises, and 
terms incorporating by reference other terms.
56
  
The level of detail is best illustrated by what follows the enumerated 
terms:  extensive charts incorporated by reference, including one that details 
the lessee’s responsibility to repair or replace.57  One section specifically 
enumerates liability for things like damage to shower hoses, rubber stoppers, 
and toilet paper holders.  Separate sections address common areas and 
include provisions for burnt out light bulbs; entrance areas, and damage to 
the door peephole; the kitchen; living room; electric fixtures; water and 
waste systems; and liability for items like damaged telephone jacks and 
towel racks.
58
   
Separate charts follow this one apportioning liability based on length 
of occupancy.  For occupancy under three months, the lessor is one-hundred 
percent responsible for repairing or replacing the window screens; after three 
months, the lessor is fifty percent responsible.  For occupancy under three 
months, the lessor is one-hundred percent responsible for repairing or 
replacing the shower hose; after that it is responsible for fifty percent of the 
costs.
59
   
In addition to the lease, there is a separate “Explanation of Important 
Terms” enumerating fifty-two important items, some different from the 
lease.  This is followed by a separate “Explanatory Document Based on the 
Ordinance for the Prevention of Disputes Relating to Leasing Residences,” 
which repeats the terms and charts apportioning liability when vacating the 
property.
60
  The result is a residential lease document, spanning a dozen 
pages in tiny font, attempting to apportion liability down to the light bulbs 
and toilet paper holders.   
This focus on defining rights and obligations is found elsewhere.  
Leases have long required that a personal guarantor assume joint and several 
                                                     
56
  Contract on file with author (Sept. 21, 2011) at arts. 11, 14-22.  Additional terms cover subleases; 
the term of the lease; permissible uses for the property; renewal of the lease; refusal to renew; rent and 
management fees; late payment; deposits; assignment of charges for utilities, taxes, and the like; 
assignment of costs for repairs; renters’ liability for damages, lessor’s disclaimer of liability, and renter’s 
insurance requirements; lessor’s right of entry; lessor’s abandonment of lease; terms for terminating the 
contract; terms for surrendering the premises terms for joint guarantors; required notices to lessor; required 
compliance with separate terms of use incorporated by reference; choice of jurisdiction; terms regarding 
return of “key money;” special terms for when corporate entities act as lessees; terms governing use of 
parking spaces and a separate subset of enumerated “special provisions” governing everything from use of 
personal information to relationships with organized crime.  Id. at 1-10, 12-13, 23-27. 
57
  Id. at Annexed Table (Beppyō) Nos. 1-3.    
58
  Id.   
59
  Id.  
60
  Id.  
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liability for the payment of any debts.
61
  Some now require guarantors to 
consent to notarized contracts, so that lessors can collect on debts without 
fully litigating the dispute.
62
  Lessees must agree to provide the necessary 
information to create the notarized document, and shoulder half the cost to 
do so.
63
   
The same trend towards complexity and strict apportionment of 
liability is not found just in property contracts.  A recent service contract 
provides an example.  At the request of its auditor, a service provider for 
small to medium-sized businesses renegotiated all of its contracts in order to 
insert disclaimers of liability and additional confidentiality requirements.  
The contract still includes standard terms identifying the parties, the purpose 
of the contract, the services provided, and the like,
64
 but it also now requires 
the buyer to assume liability for any and all acts of its employees, whether 
done privately or in the scope of employment.
65
  For some services, the 
provider warrants best efforts but now disclaims “any and all legal 
responsibility.”66  For other services, the provider explicitly limits its liability 
to damage caused by intentional acts or gross negligence, and limits 
remedies to specifically exclude consequential damages.
67
  The contract now 
contains extensive confidentiality provisions, covering even the existence of 
the contract,
68
 as well as requirements for handling personal information.
69
    
Confidentiality requirements are now regularly the subject of separate 
addenda to contracts, regardless of the nature of the services.
70
  Contract 
                                                     
61
  See, e.g., SHŌJI SHINOZUKA, SHINBAN SHAKUCHI/SHAKUYA NO KISO 134 (1984); Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Minkan Chintai Jūtaku wo Meguru Genjō to Kadai (Feb. 24, 
2009), available at http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000034783.pdf; Charles Lewis, Renter guarantee 
system a 
headache for foreigners, THE JAPAN TIMES Apr. 23, 2013, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/comm
unity/2013/04/23/issues/renter-guarantor-system-a-headache-for-foreigners/#.UXW1ArWG3pU.  
62
  Contract on file with author (May 15, 2012), art. 26.  Notarization in Japan establishes 
documentary and substantive authenticity.  A notarized contractual obligation for the repayment of money 
allows its holder to move directly to the enforcement state of the proceedings in court.  See Michael K. 
Young & Constance Hamilton, The Legal Profession, in JAPAN BUSINESS LAW GUIDE, ch. 7, ¶7-900 
(Mitsuo Matsushita ed., CCH Australia Ltd. 1988), reprinted in CURTIS J. MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE 
LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY 46, 54 (2006).  For an exhaustive study of civil law 
notaries, particularly those in Latin America, see Pedro A. Malavet, Counsel for the Situation: The Latin 
Notary, A Historical and Comparative Model, 19 HASTINGS INT’L L & COMP. L. REV. 389 (1995-1996).   
 
63
  Contract on file with author (May 15, 2012), art. 26.   
64
  Contract on file with author (Sept. 14, 2011). arts. 1-19.  The stated terms address assignment 
rights, the timing and method of payment, conditions for termination, choice of laws, and an agreement to 
meet and confer in good faith to resolve disputes relating to the contract.  Id.   
65
  Id. at art. 7. 
66
  Id. at art. 10. 
67
  Id. at art. 14.   
68
  Id. at art. 8.  
69
  Id. at art. 9.  
70
  Contract on file with author (Nov. 29, 2011).   
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addenda will set forth detailed requirements for when a service provider 
enters a purchaser’s facilities.  Pages will detail “information management” 
requirements, including appointment of “contract managers” and 
“information management supervisors.” 71   They will require signed 
confidentiality pledges, and agreements to on-site inspection of computer 
systems and facilities, with or without notice.
72
  
These contracts reflect, in part, increased complexity in the law.  The 
confidentiality requirements are, in part, attempts to comply with Japan’s 
Personal Information Protection Act and the Electronic Communications 
Enterprise Act.
73
  They also reflect increased concern about liability—
defining it, disclaiming it, and limiting remedies.  This concern is part of a 
larger shift, advocated by the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) in 
2001, from a society based on “preemptive administrative regulation to one 
based upon ex post facto oversight and remedies [and] personal 
responsibility.”74  The end result, while not uniform, is primary ordering 
based on increasingly detailed, complex contracts. 
C.  Courts and Contracts  
Regardless of the detail in the contract, when contested, Japanese 
courts often revise them.
75
  They have a long history of doing so, and 
scholars have translated representative decisions.
76
  What is remarkable is 
                                                     
71
  Id. at art. 3. 
72
  Id. at art. 6.   
73
  See generally Kojin Jōhō no Hogo ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Personal Information Protection Act], 
Law No. 57, 2003 Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu [Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi 
(last visited May 14, 2013); Denki Tsuushin Jigyō Hō [Electric Communications Enterprises Law] Law No. 
86, 1984 Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu [Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (last visited 
May 14, 2013). 
74
  See Uchida & Taylor, supra note 40, at 457, excerpting, and more succinctly translating, portions 
of the JSRC report, available in its entirety in Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council–For 
a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21
st
 Century, 2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119, 
127. 
75
  Japanese courts modify contracts based on public policy, public welfare, good faith, or an abuse of 
rights, “depending on the context of the particular relationship.”  Trevor Ryan, The Trust in an Ageing 
Japan: Has Commercialization Precluded the Trust from Reaching its Welfare Potential?, 7 ASIAN J. 
COMP. LAW 10 (2012). 
76
  In 1912, a Tokyo court found that the parties “lacked any intent” to be bound by certain portions 
of the written lease, and voided notice to terminate based on it.  A 1982 Osaka court evaluated the 
termination clause in a written lease by looking at the parties’ relative need for the property finding that 
there were “reasonable grounds” to enforce the contract if the lessor also paid the lessee his moving 
expenses.  See Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] July 3, 1912, 804 Hōritsu Shinbun 24, trans. by J. Mark 
Ramseyer reprinted in MILHAPUT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND 
COMMENTARY supra note 62, at 394-96; Osaka Chisai [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Apr. 28, 1982, 476 Hanrei 
Taimuzu 130 trans. by J. Mark Ramseyer reprinted in Milhaput et al., supra note 62, at 395-396.  Scholars 
suggest the housing shortages in the 1950s prompted the courts to weigh the relative needs of the lessor and 
lessee for the property, with greater concern for the lessee.  Nobuhisa Segawa, Fudousan no Chintaishaku–
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that courts continue to blue-line contracts, to re-write their terms, and, in 
some instances, to create new ones out of whole cloth.  As the parties define 
their rights and obligations in ever-greater detail, the courts continue to 
revise them, based on vague notions of fairness.  A recent example, 
discussed next, comes from a series of Supreme Court cases handed down 
over this past decade dealing with claims brought by sophisticated business 
entities, often major real estate developers, to lower contractually-mandated 
rent.  
1. Sublease Cases 
In traditional Japan, regardless of the lease, a lessor was expected, as a 
favor, to reduce the rent following a bad harvest, death in the family, or other 
exceptional hardship.
77
  The lessee, in turn, was expected to provide 
additional labor or other return of the favor granted.
78
  Articles 11 and 32 of 
the Land and Building Lease Act turned that favor into a legal right.
79
    
Article 11 states that if rent for land becomes “unreasonable” as a 
result of changes in taxes, land prices, or the rent departs from comparable 
rents for similar properties in the vicinity, the parties may request a rent 
increase or decrease.
80
  They may do so regardless of the contract terms, and 
if the parties can’t agree on the increase or decrease, the renter may pay an 
amount it deems reasonable, pending judgment by the court.  If the court 
finds that amount insufficient, the lessee must pay the difference, with 
interest.
81
  The same statutory framework exists, pursuant to Article 32, for 
adjustment of rent for building space.
82
 
During Japan’s economic bubble, land developers approached 
landowners with grand plans.
83
  The plans, and contracts based on them, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Sono Gendai teki Kadai, at 3, in Fudōsan no Chintaishaku no Kadai to Tenbō (Matsuo & Yamano eds., 
2012).  The 1960s and greater housing stocks saw development of eviction fees and other monetary 
remedies considered sufficient to create reasonable grounds for eviction.  Id.  Not limited to leases, a 1970 
Nagoya High court reviewed a recording contract, revising it because of “excessive profiteering.”  Nagoya 
Chisai [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Jan. 30, 1970, Hanrei Taikei 27403456, trans. by J. Mark Ramseyer reprinted in 
Milhaput et al., supra note 62, at 307. 
77
  See KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 22-29. 
78
  Id. 
79
  Shakuchi Shakuya Hō [Land and Building Lease Act], Law No. 90 of 1991, translated in Ministry 
of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=1
&re=02&dn=1&x=68&y=19&co=01&ky=land+and+building+lease+act&page=4.   
80
  Id. at art. 11.  A statutory exception excludes requests where the contract provides a fixed term 
during which rent shall not be increased.  Id.   
81
  Id. at art. 11(2) & (3). 
82
  Id. at art. 23. 
83
  Tokuhō Kaisetsu [News Alert Commentary], 1140 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 68 (Mar. 15, 2004); 
Segawa, supra note 76, at 5. 
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generally provided for the landowner to build the building(s) to an agreed 
design and the developer to rent them in their entirety and then sublease 
space to individual renters.
84
  The master leases generally established a fixed 
rent for the building, with riders providing for automatic rent increases 
during the term of the contract.
85
  Based on these plans and estimated 
revenue streams, the property owners financed construction of the 
building(s).
86
  After the collapse of the bubble and real estate market, 
developers asked for reduced rent, landowners refused, and litigation 
followed.
87
  Developers sought “confirmation” of reduced rent payable on 
the master lease, and sometimes refund of “excess rent paid;” landowners 
sought payment of unpaid rent.
88
   
Following a split in the lower courts,
89
 in 2003, the Supreme Court 
issued its first opinion applying Article 32 to these sublease contracts.
90
  In 
1986, Mitsui Fudosan, one of the largest real estate developers in Japan, 
approached a corporate landowner in Tokyo and agreed to rent all of the 
space in a proposed building for a period of fifteen years, for ¥1.9 billion per 
annum.
91
  The contract provided for a ten percent rent increase every three 
years during the lease.
92
  Based on this, the property owner obtained 
financing for construction, and, with construction complete, the first tenants 
moved in in 1991.
93
  The real estate market collapsed shortly thereafter: by 
1994, market values were fifty percent of the agreed rent; by 1997, they 
were thirty-five percent.  Mitsui Fudosan repeatedly requested rent 
reductions for the building; the owner refused; and Mitsui Fudosan 
unilaterally reduced its rent payments.  The owner then filed suit.
94
  
The district court held that Article 32 did not apply and required 
payment of the contractually-mandated rent.
95
  The high court held that 
Article 32 did apply, but the contract was, in essence, an outsourcing 
                                                     
84
  Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 88, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5. 
85
  Id. at 68-71. 
86
  Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 83, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5. 
87
  Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 83, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5. 
88
  Tokuhō Kaisetsu, supra note 83, at 68; Segawa, supra note 76, at 5. 
89
  See, e.g., Tokyo Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Jan. 25, 2000, Hei 10 (ne) no. 3894, 1020 
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 157 (applying Art. 32 on a limited basis); Tokyo Kousai [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 
27, 1999, Hei 10 (ne) no. 5145, 1017 TAIMUZU [HANTA] 278 (affirming application of Art. 32).  Tokyo 
Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 5, 2002, Hei 13 (ne) no. 4033, 1087 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 280 
(rejecting application of Art. 32).  
90
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct] Oct. 21, 2003 Hei 12 (uke) no. 573, Hei 12 (uke) no. 574, 1140 HANREI 
TAIMZU [HANTA] 68.    
91
  Id. at 68. 
92
  Id. at 69. 
93
  Id.   
94
  Id.   
95
  Id. at 69. 
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contract rather than a simple lease and Article 32 should be applied to reduce 
the rent only to the initially agreed level.
96
  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the contract was clearly a lease contract, to which Article 32 
applied without waiver or limitation.
97
  As a result, when reviewing requests 
for rent reduction, courts “should review in its totality the circumstances 
giving rise to the lessor and lessee’s decision in fixing the amount of rent as 
well as other circumstances.”98   
The Supreme Court expounded on this “totality of the circumstances” 
standard in subsequent cases.  Part of the debate related to proper 
characterization of the contracts.  Some courts argued that property 
developers and management companies working with property owners to 
develop a property undertake a “joint venture” rather than simply lease 
building space, and Article 32 should not apply.
99
  Others argued that with 
“order-made” buildings, where an owner builds to a lessee’s specifications 
and the building cannot readily be used for other purposes, the contracts 
function more like “outsourcing contracts,” and Article 32 should not 
apply.
100
  The Supreme Court rejected both arguments, and in those cases 
strictly applied Article 32 and re-wrote the leases.
101
    
Other courts have held that demands for rent reduction should be 
recognized only in special circumstances where the terms of the contract 
have “lost fairness and violate good faith.” 102   When an appellate court 
applied that standard finding that the corporate lessee was not suffering from 
financial difficulty, there had been no change in public assessments, and, 
hence, no special circumstances supporting reduction, the Supreme Court 
reversed.
103
  It found error in considering only the lessee’s overall financial 
                                                     
96
  Id.  
97
  Id. at 70, 73.   
98
  Id. at 70, 73.  This totality of the circumstances review requires consideration of (a) the process 
by which the rent terms were decided and their relationship to the market price for rent for other similar 
properties; (b) the anticipated income and expenditures for the defendant in subleasing the property, 
including the parties’ awareness regarding anticipated changes in occupancy at different rent levels; and (c) 
the plaintiff’s anticipated receipt of key money and requirements for repayment of any financing.  Id. 
99
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Mar. 10, 2005, Hei 14 no. 1954, 1179 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 185, 
186. 
100
  Id. at 186.  
101
 Id. at 186.  See also Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct. 21, 2003, Hei 13 (uke) no. 573,  1149 HANREI 
TAIMUZU [HANTA]  68; Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct. 23, 2003, Oct. 23, 2003 Hei 14 (uke) no. 852, 1140 
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]  79; Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Nov. 8, 2004, Hei 15 (uke) no. 869, 1173 
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]  192. 
102
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Mar. 10, 2005 Hei 14 (uke) no. 1954, 1179 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 
185. 
103
  Id. at 185-86. 
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condition and land assessments when “[a]ll of the circumstances should be 
comprehensively considered.”104 
Part of the debate revolved around the scope of Article 32.  In a 2003 
opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the rent and automatic 
increases were significant factors in signing the contract at issue.
105
  As a 
result, “the point of view of fairness” required consideration of these terms 
even if they weren’t binding, and precluded application of Article 32 to rent 
paid prior to occupancy of the building.
106
  In a 2008 decision, the Supreme 
Court reviewed multiple demands for rent reduction and determined what 
changes in circumstances would be considered when.
107
  The rationale 
provided explains the court’s focus.  The Supreme Court found that the 
automatic rent increases were based on the parties’ “predictions about future 
economic circumstances” and not based on an agreement at the point of the 
increase about what constituted reasonable rent “based on actual economic 
conditions.”108  To rectify that, the courts substitute their analyses based on 
current economic conditions for the parties’ earlier predictions about the 
future.   
In a 2003 decision, the Supreme Court upheld a claim for rent 
reduction, despite the parties’ entry into a lease and a separate 
“confirmation” agreement guaranteeing the rent.109  In order to convince the 
property owner to build, the real estate development company had 
specifically guaranteed above market rents in two separate documents.
110
  
The high court enforced the terms of the contract, and the Supreme Court 
reversed.
111
  The Tokyo High Court’s decision on remand is notable because 
of its fact-specific analysis.
112
   
The high court found that the owner had relied on the rent 
confirmation in entering into the joint venture, taking out the loans, and 
                                                     
104
  Id. at 186-88. 
105
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct. 21, 2003 Hei 12 (uke) no. 123, 1140 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]  
75, 78.  
106
  Id.  
107
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Feb. 29, 2008 Hei 18 (uke) no. 192, 1267 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]  
161.  Only changes in circumstances between the initial contract and the first request for reduction are 
considered initially.  For later demands, if the court upholds the first request for reduction, it considers the 
date of the later request as the starting point for determining economic change.  If the court rejects the first 
request, the starting point would default to the original contract date.  Id. 
108
  Id.  
109
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] October 23, 2003 Hei 14 (uke) no. 852, 1140 HANREI TAIMUZU 
[HANTA] 79. 
110
 Id.  
111
 Id. at 80, 81. 
112
  Tokyo Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Dec. 22, 2004, Hei 15 (ne) no. 5399, 1170 HANREI 
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 122, 123, 127.   
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investing in the project.
113
  But it found “a significant change in economic 
circumstances” and, in comparison with surrounding rents, that the 
guaranteed rent had become “unreasonable” (fusōtō na mono).114  The court 
then examined in detail the owner’s anticipated income, repayment plan, and 
the decrease in taxes and interest rates.  It found that “from the perspective 
of fairness,” the rent should be reduced regardless of the guarantee, to the 
extent doing so would not jeopardize the loan repayments.
115
  The court 
examined the parties’ negotiation efforts, and based on “consideration of all 
the circumstances in their totality,” decided on a “reasonable” amount that 
was approximately ten percent less than the contracted rent for the initial 
period.
116
     
This type of fact-sensitive analysis in determining “reasonable” rent, 
regardless of the contract, is standard.  In a 2004 decision, the Supreme 
Court found that a large real estate developer had approached a textile 
manufacturer about redeveloping land.
117
  The parties entered into a lease 
providing for fixed rent with five percent bi-annual increases.
118
  After the 
manufacturer razed a closed factory and constructed the planned buildings, 
the developer sought decreases in the rent and demanded return of “excess 
rent” paid.119  The high court found, inter alia, that the express terms of the 
contract prohibited rent reduction below the contracted amount, and those 
terms were “an absolute condition” for the landowner to develop the 
property.
120
  The court noted, however, the remarkable economic changes 
occurring following collapse of the bubble and invalidated two of the rent 
increases.
121
   
The Supreme Court reversed, finding this remedy too limited.  The 
concurring and dissenting opinions bookend the debate.
122
  The dissent 
argued that the history of the Act makes clear that it was intended to protect 
“socially weaker parties,” i.e. residential tenants, and this was a joint venture 
between sophisticated parties.
123
  According to the dissent, the Act’s purpose 
                                                     
113
  Tokyo High Ct Dec. 22, 2004, supra note 119, at 122, 123, 127.   
114
  Id. at 123, 128.  The court found that the actual rental income for the building was approximately 
half that expected.  The court noted that the owner’s property taxes had decreased by a third, and the 
interest rates paid on the construction loans were variable and falling.  Id.  
115
  Id. at 123, 128. 
116
  Id. at 123.   
117
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Nov. 8, 2004, (uke) no. 869, 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 192. 
118
 Id. at 192. 
119
 Id.  
120
  Id. at 192.   
121
  Id. at 192.   
122
  Id. at 193.   
123
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Nov. 8, 2004, (uke) no. 869, 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA], supra 
note 117 at 193, 197. 
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was not to reassign profits between sophisticated parties; “freedom of 
contract” should prevail.124  The concurring opinion focused on “fairness,” 
as opposed to freedom of contract.
125
  In this case, because the interest due 
on the construction loans had decreased, it was “fair” to decrease the rent as 
well.
126
  To allow only the lessor to benefit from the unforeseeably large 
drop in interest rates, when those interest rates formed the basis for 
determining rent under the contract, “lacks fairness.”127   
Other decisions have applied this type of analysis to direct leases for 
“order-made” buildings and standard leases for common building space.128  
The Supreme Court has applied this analysis to cases involving leases of 
land.
129
  Whether it is a contract for the lease of land or a building, a 
sublease or a direct lease, the focus in the courts is on substantive fairness in 
light of current, as opposed to anticipated, conditions.
130
  In doing so, the 
courts redefine the relationship.  The parties clearly assign risks and 
liabilities in their contracts and “confirmation agreements.”  The courts 
revise those assignments.  When the courts elect to apply Article 32 instead 
of enforcing the terms of the contract, clear divisions of rights and 
responsibilities give way to notions of equity and “fairness.”  
2. Lease Renewal & Other Cases 
These cases are not an anomaly.  The courts have recently engaged in 
substantive review of clearly designated contractual terms in reviewing 
“renewal fees” for leases.131  They have done the same for supply contracts 
and insurance agreements.
132
  In each of these areas, recent Supreme Court 
                                                     
124
  Id. at 197.   
125
  Id. at 196.   
126
  Id. at 193.  The concurring opinion focused on “the original intent of the contract,” suggesting that 
“not only the cost of the building and the rents charged for similar, proximately located buildings, but also 
the method for servicing debt on the property is a foremost consideration in establishing the rent term,” 
such that if interest rates fall the rent should as well.  Id. at 196. 
127
  Id. at 197.   
128
  See Segawa, supra note 76, at 6-7. 
129
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] June 12, 2003, Hei 14 (uke) no. 689, 1126 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 
106. 
130
  Some scholars have suggested that courts are preserving relationships, i.e. the courts treat the 
parties as partners in a partnership that cannot readily be terminated because of a poor economic climate or 
other circumstances.  The courts craft a judicial resolution with this in mind, engaging in small-scale debt 
restructuring, prior to significant economic disruption.  See Segawa, supra note 76, at 7-8. 
131
  See, e.g., Takagi Harumichi, Hanrei Kenkyū Iinkai Heisei 23 Nen Kōshinryō Hanrei Kenkyū no 
Hōkokushō, TOKYO SHIHŌ SHŌSHIKAI SAMTAMA SHIKAI, available at http://www.3tama.org/kenshu/hanrei
3.htm. 
132
  See Tooru Kamiyama, Keizoku teki Baibai Keiyaku ni Kan suru Hito Kōsatsu, 5 HOKUDAI 
HŌGAKU KENKYŪKA [JUNIOR RESEARCH JOURNAL] 1, 3 (Nov. 1998); Shindo & Nakajima, Chūshaku §§ 
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decisions rein in dramatic departures from the terms of the contract, but the 
starting point is the same.  It expressly involves consideration of the equities.   
With regard to lease renewals, practices vary by region but lessors, 
pursuant to the contract, commonly assess a renewal fee at the end of the 
lease term if a lease is renewed.
133
  The renewal fees can be substantial, the 
equivalent of one to two months’ rent, though amounts are sometimes 
negotiable.  They are also subject to challenge.
134
   
While challenges to renewal fees began as early as the 1960s, the 
1996 revisions to the small claims provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure 
and the 2000 passage of Japan’s Consumer Contract Act accelerated these  
claims.
135
  And the courts have started invalidating renewal fees.
136
  In a 
2009 decision, the Osaka High Court invalidated renewal fees in a one-year 
lease that required key money of ¥60,000, monthly rent of ¥45,000, and a 
lease renewal fee of ¥100,000.
137
  The court found this renewal fee, imposed 
every year, violated the Civil Code’s Article 1(2) good faith requirement as 
incorporated into the Consumer Contract Act.
138
  The renewal fee did not 
function as consideration and imposed an excess burden on the lessee 
beyond that provided for in the Civil Code.
139
  It “lacked a rational basis” 
given the difference in information available to the lessor and lessee;
140
 the 
Land and Building Lease Act limitations on the lessor’s ability to terminate 
the lease;
141
 and the significant economic burden the fee imposed on the 
lessor.
142
       
                                                                                                                                                              
537-539 Daishansha no Tame no Keiyaku, SHINPAN CHŪSHAKU MINPŌ (13) SAIKEN (4) 776 (Igarashi 
Kiyoshi & Taniguchi Kohei eds.) (2006). 
133
  Id.   
134
  See Segawa, supra note 76, at 11-12. 
135
  See id. 
136
  Kōshinryō Saibanrei no Shōsai Hikaku, TŌKYŌ SHIHŌ SHŌSHIKAI SANTAMA SHIKAI (December 
2010), available at www.3tama.org/kenshu/hanrei/koushinryou2.pdf  (last visited July 2, 2012). 
137
  Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct] Aug. 27, 2009 Hei 20 (ne) nos. 474, 1023, 2062 HANREI 
JIHŌ 40.  
138
  Article 10 of the Consumer Contract Act nullifies contract clauses that “impair the interests of 
consumers one-sidedly.”  More specifically, contract clauses that (a) restrict consumer rights or impose 
duties on consumers beyond that provided in default provisions the Civil and Commercial Codes and (b) 
that “impair the interests of consumers” in a manner that violates the good faith provision of the Civil Code 
are deemed to be void.  Shōhisha Keiyaku Hō [Consumer Contract Act], Law No. 61 of 2000, art. 10, 
translated in Ministry of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation
.go.jp http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp. 
139
  Article 601 of the Civil Code provides: “A lease shall become effective when one of the parties 
promises to make a certain thing available for the using and taking the profits by the other party and the 
other party promises to pay rent for the same.”  Minpō [Minpō] [Civ. C.] art. 601, translated in Ministry of 
Justice, Japanese Law Translation, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp. 
140
  Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct] Aug. 27, 2009, supra note 138.   
141
  The court is referring to Article 28, which sets out “Requirements for Refusing to Renew a 
Building Lease Contract” and states that notice of termination requires a showing, based on the parties 
relationship, the conditions of the building, and offers of compensation, “that there are justifiable grounds 
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Subsequent courts split on the issue,
143
 and the Supreme Court 
weighed in by reviewing three renewal fee cases in 2011.
144
  The court 
upheld each renewal fee, finding the Consumer Contract Act applicable but 
not violated.
145
  The Supreme Court found that the renewal fees functioned 
as either prepayment or supplemental rent, and that they had a “rational 
economic basis.” 146   The court held “an unambiguous and concretely 
enumerated renewal clause in a lease contract will not constitute contractual 
language which ‘impairs the interests of consumers unilaterally against the 
fundamental principle provided in Civil Code Article 1(2),’” so long as there 
are no “special circumstances suggesting, inter alia, that the amount of the 
renewal fee is too high in light of such factors as the renewal term of the 
lease contract.”147  Lower courts are now determining whether renewal fees 
are “too high,” and in some cases still voiding the plain language of the 
contract.
148
  The result is that the contractual term does not necessarily 
define rights.  It provides the starting point for an analysis based on 
fairness.
149
 
The focus on fairness extends to long-term supply contracts.
150
  
Professor Haley has written about the judicial treatment of these contracts 
and discusses several notable decisions.
151
  In one, Hokkaido Ford Tractor, 
K.K. attempted to terminate a tractor franchise pursuant to the notice and 
termination provisions in the contract.
152
  The franchisee sued and the 
Sapporo High Court, in response, enjoined Ford from selling product to any 
                                                                                                                                                              
for doing so in addition to the circumstances pertaining to the necessity of using the buildings on the part of 
the building lessor and the lessee.”  Land and Building Lease Act, supra note 79, art. 28.  
142
  Kōshinryō Saibanrei no Shōsai Hikaku, supra note 136. 
143
  Id.  Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Oct. 29, 2009, Hei 29 (ne) no. 1211, 2064 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 65; Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Feb. 23, 2010, Hei 21 (ne) no. 2690, 1372 
KIN’YŪ SHOUJI HANREI [KINYŪ HANREI]14; Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] May 27, 2010, Hei 21 
(ne) no. 2548, Dai-ichi Hōki Hō Jōhō Sōgō Database, Case Id. No. 28161602.  A 2009 Kyoto District 
Court also found the renewal fees were “a unilateral infringement on consumer benefits,” with no “legally 
justifiable grounds.”  Contract Renew Fees Violate Tenant Rights, JAPAN TIMES, July 24, 2009.   
144
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] July 15, 2011 Hei 22 (o) no. 863, 1361 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]  89. 
145
  Id.   
146
  The court also found use of renewal fees wide spread and noted that they had not been struck 
down previously for violating public policy.  Their use was clearly and concretely explained in the contract, 
and the disparity between the information and bargaining power of the lessor and lessee not so great as to 
demand correction.  Id. 
147
  Id.   
148
  Kyoto Chihō Saibansho [Kyoto Dist. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2012, Hei 21 (wa) no. 4696, 92 SHŌHISHA NYU-
SU 257.   See, e.g., Harumichi, supra note 132.   
149
  Scholars have suggested that Article 10 of the Consumer Contract Act is being interpreted more 
broadly than the good faith provisions of the Civil Code.  Segawa, supra note 76, at 12.   
150
  Kamiyama, supra note 133, at 3. 
151
  Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice in Japan, supra note 37, at 64-67.  
152
  Sapporo Kōtō Saibansho [Sapporo High Ct.] Sept. 30, 1987, Sho 62 (ra) no. 49, 667 HANREI 
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 146-147. 
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other dealer in the region for a period of one year.
153
  While Ford complied 
with the terms of the contract, it did not have “unavoidable reasons” to 
terminate it.
154
   
The court found that the contract provision providing for yearly 
renewal, absent three months advance notice, should be interpreted to mean 
that “only where there are unavoidable circumstances requiring ending the 
contract is it permitted to give notice” of termination.155  The court reasoned 
that because Ford had renewed the annual contract for over fifteen years, and 
the retailer had invested in research and incurred labor costs assuming 
renewal and without ability to establish a similar franchise, it was 
“extremely irrational” to impose on the retailer significant losses while 
allowing Ford to profit from the business that the retailer had developed.
156
   
Courts have defined “unavoidable circumstances” narrowly:  “absent 
unavoidable circumstances, such as a complete rupture of trust in the 
relationship, it is appropriate to find that the contract cannot be terminated or 
its renewal refused.” 157   Some courts have improvised notice provisions 
where none are found in the contract.
158
  Some courts have established new 
contractual requirements that the purchaser have breached the agreement, or 
developed credit problems, or acted in bad faith before termination is 
permissible.
159
   
More recent decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court have upheld 
termination of long-term supply contracts, leading some to suggest an 
increased reluctance to interfere with the contract.
160
  But, in each case, the 
courts upheld the notices to terminate following a clear breach of other terms 
of the contract.
161
  The starting point for practitioners remains the same: 
regardless of the language of the contract, “a Japanese court is likely to 
                                                     
153
  Id. 
154
  Id.  
155
  Id. at 146, 148.  
156
  Id. at 146-47. 
157
  Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Oct. 25, 1996, Hei 8 (ne) no. 190, 1595 HANREI 
JIHŌ [HANJI] 70. 
158
  See Kamiyama, supra note 133, at 3. 
159
  Id.  Courts offer a number of reasons why they re-write the contracts.  They do so most commonly 
to protect investments in people and resources and prevent or cushion the blow to the purchaser’s business.  
They also cite the need to protect a long-established relationship; to recognize the research or other 
business development contributions made by the purchaser to the supplier’s business; to protect the 
expectation interests of the retailer or the weaker party to the contract.  They re-write the contracts because 
termination of contracts are to be the exception and not the rule; because, regardless of the one year 
renewable contract term, a one-year term is not economically feasible for the retailer; or to protect the 
interests of the down-stream buyer, relying on the retailer and its relationship with the manufacturer.  Id. at 
10-11.  The courts are re-writing contracts based on Japanese notions of equity and protecting relationships. 
160
  See Haley, Rethinking Contract Practice in Japan, supra note 37, at 65-67.  
 
   
161
  Id. 
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require ‘justifiable and unavoidable reasons’ in order to allow unilateral 
termination” of a “continuous contract.” 162   And the reason remains the 
same:  regardless of the contract, “the non-terminating party typically will 
make business decisions relying on the expected long duration of the 
agreement (and Japanese courts believe that such reasonable expectations 
should be protected).”163    
Japan’s group term life insurance cases show a similar pattern, with 
courts—at least the lower courts—revising detailed contracts.  Japanese 
companies have purchased group term life insurance policies naming the 
employees as the insured since the 1930s, but, for decades, administrative 
guidance resulted in most policies prohibiting companies from naming 
themselves as beneficiaries.
164
  With deregulation and increased competition 
that changed, and that change sparked protest.
165
  In 1970, a cargo ship sunk 
off the coast of Hokkaido and its entire crew perished.
166
  The shipping 
company received ¥1 million in insurance proceeds per crew member, and 
paid ¥100,000 to each surviving family.
167
  Public outcry led to new 
disclosure and consent requirements.
168
  Insurance companies, however, 
continued to market the policies as a means to cover employer losses.
169
  The 
policies typically lasted one year and covered all employees, with the 
employer paying the entire premium.
170
  By the mid-1990s, 79.6% of 
companies with over one-thousand employees and 60% of all businesses in 
Japan purchased group term policies; 49.7% of them paid nothing to the 
survivors of its employees.
171
    
In the mid-1990s, survivors began suing the decedent’s former 
employer and the insurance companies, demanding payment of the insurance 
proceeds.
172
  And courts began finding for the plaintiffs.
173
  They did so on 
one of two grounds:  (a) they found an implied agreement between the 
company and the employee for the company to pay over a significant portion 
                                                     
162
  Stephen D. Bohrer & Akio Hoshi, Doing Deals in Japan: An Introductory Guide for U.S. 
Practitioners, THE M & A LAWYER (Thomson Reuters), Oct. 2010, at 10. 
163
  Id. 
164
  See background discussion in Chihō Saibansho [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Mar. 6, 2001, Hei 9 (wa) no. 
2716, 1093 HANREI TAIMUZU 228, 232-33. 
165
  Id.   
166
  Id. at 233-34. 
167
  Id.  
168
  Id.  
169
  Id. at 235-36. 
170
  Yuichi Fukushima, Dantai Teiki Hoken Mondai no Genjo to Sono Yukue, at 171 (Koueki Zaidan 
Hōjin Seimei Hoken Bunka Senta- Paper), available at www.jili.or.jp (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
171
  Id. at 236. 
172
  Id. at 236. 
173
  Shindo & Nakajima, supra note 133, at 776-77. 
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of the proceeds to the employee’s survivors; or (b) the courts construed the 
contract between the insurance provider and the company as a “contract for 
the benefit of a third party,” pursuant to Civil Code Section 537.174  The 
plain language of Civil Code requires that the obligor “promise[] in a 
contract” that he or she will “tender a certain performance” to a third 
party,
175
 meaning that the courts were implying a term that the Civil Code 
otherwise requires be made explicit.   
The most significant of these cases involved Sumitomo Light Metal 
Industries.
176
  In 1994, three Sumitomo employees passed away from natural 
causes.
177
  Sumitomo, pursuant to its company work rules and an agreement 
with the employee union, paid each of their spouses approximately ¥10 
million as a death benefit;
178
 insurers, pursuant to life insurance policies 
covering these employees, paid Sumitomo approximately ¥183 million.
179
    
The surviving spouses filed suit claiming an express or implied 
agreement to pay over all or a substantial portion of the insurance 
proceeds.
180
  Sumitomo contended that the proceeds were intended to fund 
corporate pension and welfare funds covering all its employees and there 
was no express or implied agreement to pay more than the death benefits 
agreed to in the work rules.
181
   
The Nagoya High Court revised the contract, in no uncertain terms.  It 
held that group term insurance was intended to benefit the employee and a 
contracting party diverting these funds to other uses “violated the public 
order and morals.”182  It found that the documents that confirmed that “all or 
a portion of the insurance proceeds would be used to pay survivor benefits 
based on the company work rules” should be construed instead as an 
agreement to pay, “at a minimum, an amount rising to a level considered to 
                                                     
174
  Id.   
175
  Article 537 (1) of the Civil Code states: “If one of the parties promises in a contract that he/she 
will tender a certain performance to any third party, the third party shall have the right to claim that 
performance directly from the obligor.”  Minpō [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 537, para. 1. 
176
  See Nagoya Chihō Saibansho, Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 288; Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho 
[Nagoya High Ct.] Apr. 24, 2002, Hei 13 (Ne) no. 245, 829 RŌDŌ HANREI 38; Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. 
Ct.] Apr. 11, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) no. 1358, 1212 HANREI TAIMUZU 102; Fukushima, supra note 171, at 171-
172; Takeshi Matsuda, Dantai Teiki Hoken ni Okeru Hihokensha no Chii, 40 SANDAI HŌGAKU (Nos. 3/4) 
67 (2007).  
177
  Nagoya Chihō Saibansho, Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 228-229. 
178
  Id. at 228-229. 
179
  Id., 242-250.  Sumitomo obtained consent to the policies through the agreement with its employee 
union.  Id. at 251.  See also Fukushima, supra note 171, at 173. 
180
  Nagoya Chihō Saibansho,Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 228. 
181
  Id. 
182
  Saikōsai Saibansho, Apr. 11, 2006, supra note 176 at, 105, citing Nagoya Kōsai [Nagoya High 
Ct.] Apr. 24, 2002, Hei 13 (Ne) no. 245, 829 RŌDŌ HANREI 38.   
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be socially significant.”183  The court found this agreement created a contract 
for the benefit of a third party and ordered Sumitomo to pay each surviving 
spouse approximately one half of the insurance proceeds.
184
   
The Supreme Court reversed.  It found no legislative policy requiring 
payment of more than a portion of the insurance proceeds, and, so long as 
consent was obtained, no violation of the public order and morals.  It found 
no grounds to support either an express or implied agreement to pay more 
than the death benefits provided for in the work rules.
185
   
The issue is now largely resolved.
186
  Group term policies now clearly 
identify the portions payable to the employee’s survivors, and cap the 
portion payable to the employer at no more than twenty million yen.
187
  But 
the process is telling.  The parties start off with identified rights and 
obligations set out in the insurance contracts, company work rules, and 
employer-employee agreements.  Once challenged, the lower courts rewrite 
those rights and obligations so that they are “fair.”  To use the language of 
the Nagoya court, to require payment at a level “considered to be socially 
significant.”  The contract provides a starting point; an evaluation of the 
equities follows.   
D.  Contract Law Conclusion 
Professors Taylor and Uchida have suggested that following 
deregulation in the 1990s, a new role for contract form and practice, 
grounded in the “classical view of contracts,” has swept across Japanese 
society.
188
  They describe a “conquest of contract,” and even the paradigm of 
family being replaced by contract.
189
  Part of this stems from a shift to an ex 
post facto model based on personal responsibility.
190
  Part of this stems from 
increasing belief that economic efficiency can be achieved “on the basis of 
discrete contracts.”191  Regardless of the cause, the “written contract” is now 
                                                     
183
  Id.  
184
  Id.; Nagoya Chihō Saibansho, Mar. 6, 2001, supra note 165, at 240. 
185
  Saikōsai Saibansho, Apr. 11, 2006, supra note 176, at 106. 
186
  Matsuda, supra note 176 at 67; Fukushima, supra note 171, at 171; Saikōsai Saibansho, Apr. 11, 
2006 April 11, 2006, supra note 176, at 106. 
187
  Matsuda, supra note 176 at 67; Fukushima, supra note 171, at 171. 
188
  Taylor & Uchida, supra note 40, at 454, 455. 
189
  Id. at 465.  Neither endorses this shift but question the extent to which Japanese society can 
commit to norms where “non-contractual social relations and social relations governed by relational 
contracts are displaced by the discrete contract.”  Id. at 474. 
190
  Id. at 456.   
191
  Id. at 462. 
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“the device for constructing the relationship, apportioning risk, and also for 
articulating new concerns.”192 
A review of recent contracts suggests that they are right, down to the 
level of shower hoses and rubber stoppers.  A review of recent case law 
suggests that there is more.  Professors Taylor and Uchida question whether 
courts will support “a communitarian vision of commerce in which smaller 
or weaker transaction parties are protected through operation of law, or 
whether ‘the market’ should dictate transaction outcomes.” 193   The lease 
renewal cases and group term insurance cases suggest the lower courts 
continue to view justice as protecting the weaker transaction party.  The 
sublease cases involve sophisticated corporate entities and suggest that, even 
without a disparity in bargaining power or knowledge, the courts will 
intervene to revise a contract so that it is “fair.”   
The result is that there are now two sets of norms at work.  The first 
layer imposed by the written contract, provides a complex, division of rights 
and liabilities.  The second layer, applied by the courts, incorporates a 
totality of the circumstances test to achieve substantive fairness in the 
contract.  Sophisticated parties evaluate risk and reward, and dicker specific 
terms to a contract.  Or, they inject specific terms and broad imposition of 
liability into adhesion contracts.  In either case, when contested, the courts 
re-evaluate.  Just as courts re-ordered relationships in the 1950s and 1960s 
requiring “reasonable grounds” to terminate a residential lease, they re-order 
contractual relationships now, even among sophisticated parties, to achieve a 
“fair” result.194   
The end result is that when disputes arise parties to a contract 
negotiate first in the shadow of increasingly detailed contracts.  And when 
those negotiations fail and the legal process is invoked, they negotiate in the 
shadow of equitable norms applied by the courts. 
III.  EMPLOYMENT LAW & PRACTICE IN JAPAN 
Employment law presents another subset of contracts and another 
example of law in Japan operating on two levels, with primary ordering 
based on complex, detailed contractual norms and secondary ordering based 
on more ambiguous, equitable standards.  A review of employment 
documentation and the case law interpreting it shows that detailed contracts 
                                                     
192
  Id. at 473.  
193
  Taylor & Uchida, supra note 40, at 469.   
194
  See Segawa, supra note 76, at 8-9. 
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specifically defining rights and obligations routinely conflict with the 
equitable norms applied by the courts.
195
  
A. The Employment Relationship 
Employer-employee relationships in Japan are varied these days.  An 
employer may employ a half-dozen different types of employees, including 
“life-time” or regular employees; fixed-term employees; part-time 
employees; “dispatch” employees, employees provided by a temporary 
agency; and employees seconded from affiliated companies.
196
  The focus 
here is on regular employees.   
Most do not receive a contract for employment or an engagement 
letter.
197
  The employer-employee relationship begins with receipt of an 
informal offer of employment (naiteisho).
198
  That informal offer of 
employment simply states that an unofficial offer of employment is being 
extended to the prospective employee to begin work on a certain date.
199
  
The employment relationship itself is governed by separate documents, 
including an employee Covenant on Employment (shūshoku seiyakusho),200 
a Personal Guaranty (mimoto hoshōsho),201  and the Work Rules (shūgyō 
kisoku).
202
  The first two documents are provided with the informal offer of 
employment and require signatures and affixing the employee’s personal 
seal as a condition for starting work.
203
  The last document, the Work Rules, 
is usually provided to employees when they start work.
204
  As set out below, 
                                                     
195
  For comprehensive discussion of employment law issues, in Japanese, see, e.g.,  KAZUO SUGENO, 
RŌDŌ HŌ (9th ed. 2010) and, in English, see, e.g., HIDEKI THURGOOD KANO, JAPAN STAFF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW GUIDE (2010); Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the 
Service of–Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996). 
196
  See, e.g., KANO, supra note 196, at 17-18; Yutaka Asao, Overview of Non-Regular Employment 
in Japan (Japanese Institute for Labour Policy and Training) available at www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/doc
uments/jilpt-reports/no.10_japan.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).   
197
  Makoto Ishida, Kigyō Sōshiki to Rōdōhō–Hendō no Rekishi to Kadai, 206 SHŪKAN RŌDŌHŌ 14, 
21 (2004).  Most regular employees are not provided with a written contract; the company’s work rules are 
considered the employment contract.  Id. 
198
  Id.; Offers of Employment (2007-2012) on file with author. 
199
  Ishida, supra note 198, at 21.  
200
 Covenants on Employment (1957, 2007-2012) on file with author. 
201
  Personal Guarantees (2007-2011) on file with author. 
202
  Work Rules (2009-2012) on file with author. 
203
  See Covenants on Employment, supra note 201; see also Personal Guarantees, supra note 202; see 
also Osaka Pref. Govt., Rōdō Sōdan Q & A 11, available at http://www.pref.osaka.jp/sogorodo/roudouqa/q
a11.html. 
204
  See, e.g., Tokyou Rōdōkyoku, Shuugyou Kisoku Sakusei no Tebiki, available at http://tokyo-
roudoukyoku.jsite.mhlw.go.jp/hourei_seido_tetsuzuki/roudoukijun_keiyaku/k-kisoku.html (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2012); Rōdō Keiyaku Hō [Labor Contract Act], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 7, translated in 
Ministry of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/de
tail/?ft=1&re=02&dn=1&x=0&y=0&co=01&ky=labor+contract+act&page=20. 
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the contents of each of these documents have trended towards increasing 
specificity and attempts to contractually impose liability on employees—
attempts which have been thwarted by the courts.   
1. Covenant on Employment  
In 1957, a group of manufacturers published a template for the 
employee’s Covenant on Employment that enumerated just three articles.  
The new employee vowed to 1) uphold the work rules, work in good faith, 
and avoid disrupting the workplace; 2) not disclose confidential information, 
either during or after employment; and 3) compensate the employer for 
losses caused to the company by the employee’s intentional or grossly 
negligent acts.
205
  The employee acknowledged in the oath that if he or she 
violated the covenant, he or she may be terminated or face other disciplinary 
action.
206
   
A 2007 template requires more.  In it a new employee promises to 1) 
abide by the work rules, supervisor's directions, and work in good faith; 2) 
refrain from disclosing, either during or after employment, any confidential 
information held by the company; 3) refrain from engaging in any political 
or group activities that would disrupt the workplace; 4) compensate the 
employer for any damages caused to the company intentionally or through 
gross negligence; and 5) refrain from objecting should the employee's place 
or type of work be changed because of business necessity.
207
 
A recent 2011 example goes further still.  The new employee pledges, 
as a condition of employment, to 1) faithfully observe all relevant laws, the 
work rules, and other rules and directives; 2) refrain from engaging in any 
conduct that damages the reputation or credibility of the employer or its 
clients; 3) affirm that no misrepresentations were made in the employee’s 
application materials; 4) maintain the confidentiality of employer and client 
information; and 5) refrain from removing confidential information from the 
workplace.
208
   
The 2011 covenant then focuses on liability.  The employee must 
expressly pledge, as a condition of employment, that 6) if the employee 
leaks company information outside the company, during employment or 
after, or is found to be responsible for other “incidents” resulting in damage 
to the company, the employee will assume liability to compensate the 
                                                     
205
  Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, Seiyakusho Oyobi Mimoto Hoshōsho no Mondaiten to Shoshikirei, 
1423 RŌSEI JIHŌ 26 (May 24, 1957). 
206
  Id. at 26.  
207
  Covenant on Employment (Mar. 10, 2007), on file with author. 
208
  Covenant on Employment (Oct. 3, 2011), on file with author.  
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employer for any damages suffered.  The employee must also acknowledge 
that 7) if he or she violates these covenants, relevant laws, the work rules, or 
other regulations and policies, he or she may be subject to disciplinary action 
including termination, and, if these violations result in “direct or indirect” 
damage to the employer, the employee again “assumes full liability.”209   
While one might expect a confidentiality agreement, how many entry-
level employment relationships elsewhere start with an indemnification 
agreement, repeated twice to make absolutely clear where liability lies?  The 
literature suggests requesting such covenants is “the norm” among 
employers.
210
  A recent survey of private universities suggests that, 
regardless of whether provided for in the Work Rules, 86.5% of the 
universities require employees sign Covenants on Employment.
211
      
The implication is that their use is widespread, and that the starting 
point in ordering employment relationships in Japan is a document detailing 
specific rights and obligations in a manner and to a degree not found even in 
“litigious” countries.  Some have suggested that the purpose of the covenant 
is to “raise awareness” and that it has no legal meaning in and of itself; it is 
simply a “factual act” (jijitsu kōi). 212   The language of the covenant, 
however, is the language of contract clearly defining rights and liability, 
assumptions of risk, and indemnification.
213
  
2. Personal Guarantees 
The concern about indemnification, repeated twice in the covenant, 
continues in the personal guaranty document demanded of new employees.  
Pursuant to this document, a third party assumes joint liability, with the new 
employee, and agrees to indemnify the company for any damage sustained 
by the company as a result of actions of the employee.
214
   
Personal guarantees have been used for decades.
215
  The earliest 
personal guarantees were used simply to confirm identity.
216
  Some included 
promises to search for and return employees who had run away or to accept 
                                                     
209
  Id.  The document concludes with a separate section detailing the employee’s agreement regarding 
employer use of his or her personal information.  Id.   
210
 Osaka Pref. Govt, Rōdō Soudan Q & A 11, supra note 204; Chieko Shitayama, Shinnyuu Shain ni 
Teishutsu Saseru Shourui no Houritsu Mondai to Tadashii Atsukaikata, KIGYOU JITSUMU 88 (Mar. 2008). 
211
  Seiyakusho∙Mimoto Hoshoshou ni Kan Suru Anketo Kekka, 426 SHIGAKU KEIEI 89 (Aug. 2010). 
212
  Id. at 90-91; Osaka Pref. Govt, Rōdō Soudan Q & A 11, supra note 204.  
213
  Id.  Cases that have challenged the covenants have focused on employee refusal to submit them.  
Id.  
214
  Personal Guarantees, supra note 201.  
215
  KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 108-13. 
216
  Id. at 108. 
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responsibility for employees who fell ill.
217
  Guarantees after World War II 
came to focus on liability.  A 1959 survey suggested that 94% of companies 
required personal guarantees.
218
  In them, the guarantors would vaguely 
“accept full responsibility to ensure no inconvenience is caused to the 
employer by employing this person”219 or more specifically “to promptly 
compensate the company for damages caused by the employee to the 
company.”220    
A 2007 template has the guarantor agreeing to “promptly 
compensate,” jointly with the employee, the employer for “any monetary 
damages or damage to the employer’s good name caused by the employee.”  
The employer, in turn, agrees to notify the guarantor without delay if (a) it 
becomes aware of any facts suggesting that the employee may not be fit for 
employment or act in good faith, which may give rise to liability on the part 
of the guarantor, or (b) the employee changes position, and this results in 
added liability or a difficulty of supervision on the part of the guarantor.
221
  
The 2011 example again goes further.  It has the third party act as a 
“personal guarantor” of the new employee for “all aspects” of the new 
employee and “guarantee” that the new employee will “work faithfully and 
observe the Covenant on Employment, Work Rules, and other applicable 
rules and directives.”222  There is broad language about vague concepts like 
“working faithfully,” but the guarantor also specifically assumes “full 
liability,” jointly with the employee, to “immediately compensate” the 
employer for any damages “direct or indirect” if the employee violates any 
provision on the Covenant on Employment, Work Rules, or other rules or 
directives, for a period of five years from the date of the contract.
223
   
From early on, the courts have limited such imposition of liability.
224
  
As early as 1929, a Japanese court reviewed a personal guarantee for an 
employee that imposed unlimited liability on the guarantor and limited it to a 
“reasonable amount.”225  Later courts adopted and expanded this holding,226 
                                                     
217
  Id. at 109. 
218
  Id. at 109. 
219
  Id. at 108.   
220
  Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, supra note 206, at 26. 
221
  Personal Guaranty (Feb. 17, 2007), on file with author. 
222
  Id. 
223
  Personal Guaranty (Oct. 2, 2011), on file with author.  Id.   
224
  Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, supra note 206, at 26, 30. 
225
  KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 110-11.   
226
  Id. 
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and the Diet codified it in the Law Regarding Personal Guarantees enacted 
in 1933.
227
   
The Personal Guarantees Law limits the guarantee to a renewable 
period of five years, three if no term is stated.
228
  It requires that the 
employer notify the guarantor 1) if there is evidence of unsatisfactory work 
performance or bad faith; or 2) if there are any material changes in the type 
of work the employee performs or its location.
229
  In either case, following 
notice, the law allows the guarantor to cancel the guarantee.
230
  If the 
employer fails to provide such notice, that provides grounds to reduce the 
liability of the guarantor.
231
  Regardless of notice, the law instructs a court 
before imposing liability to consider “each and every circumstance, 
compared with the other,” including those circumstances giving rise to the 
guarantor becoming a guarantor, and the work responsibilities and personal 
history of the employee.
232
   
Standard interpretation of these provisions is that if the employer 
promoted the employee to a position of responsibility, the employer should 
be held responsible, not the guarantor.
233
  Courts have held a refusal to 
provide a personal guaranty constitutes grounds for dismissal.
234
  But, in 
reviewing a claim for damages based on the guarantee, they will examine 
any negligence on the part of the employer, the circumstances giving rise to 
the claim, and changes in the employee’s work or physical condition, i.e. 
courts will examine the circumstances in their totality.  As a result, simple 
negligence on the part of the employee will rarely give rise to an order for 
the guarantor to pay damages, and if any are ordered they are limited in 
amount.
235
  
Some sources suggest requesting a personal guarantee is “the 
norm,”236 and surveys suggest the reason for utilizing these contracts is to 
raise employee awareness and provide a basis for claiming employee 
                                                     
227
  Mimoto Hoshōnin ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Law Regarding Personal Guarantees], Law No. 42 of 
1933, art. 1 Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu [Hōrei DB], available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-
bin/idxsearch.cgi.   
228
  Id.  
229
  Id. at art. 3, para. 2. 
230
  Id. at art. 4. 
231
 Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, supra note 206, at 26, 30.  
232
  Law Regarding Personal Guarantees, supra note 227, art. 3, para. 2, art. 5. 
233
  Amagasaki Kōgyō Keikyō, supra  note 206, at 26, 30. 
234
  Osaka Pref. Govt., Roudou Soudan Q & A 11, supra note 204.   
235
  Id. 
236
 Id.  A recent survey of private universities suggests that 52.7% request personal guarantees, 
whether provided for in the work rules or not.  Seiyakusho∙Mimoto Hoshoshō ni Kan Suru Anketo Kekka, 
supra note 212, at 90.   
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liability if a problem arises.
237
  The effect is to create layers of the law 
governing employment relationships, starting with detailed documents 
assigning rights and liabilities, which the case law and statutory law then 
eviscerate.
238
   
But employers continue to use them, creating more complex, detailed 
impositions of liability in the process.  Instead of bargaining in the shadow 
of the law, employers bargain for more than the law permits and negotiate on 
that basis until the dispute escalates to the point of intervention by legal 
counsel or the courts.  At that point, specific norms are modified or replaced 
by “totality of the circumstances” standards.   
3. Work Rules 
After the employee walks in the door, the Work Rules govern 
employee rights and duties.  Work Rules are mandatory for any employer 
with over ten employees,
239
 and, as Japan’s Labor Contract Act makes clear, 
they are considered a binding contract between the employer and the 
employee.
240
  No signatures are required, but the document must be filed 
with the local labor bureau.
241
  Any changes must be negotiated with a 
representative of the majority of employees in the work place, who will 
submit an opinion letter regarding the changes that is filed with the labor 
bureau.
242
  
                                                     
237
 Id.; Yamashita Chieko, Shinnyuushain ni Teishutsu Saseru Shorui no Houritsu Mondai to 
Tadashii Atsukai, KIGYŌ JITSUMU 88 (March 2008). 
238
  Professor Kawashima cites to personal guarantees as evidence of the gap between the law and 
expectations.  KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI, supra note 1, at 109-12.  The vague language of the 
contract suggests unlimited liability on the part of the guarantor but in practice neither employer nor the 
guarantor expect such liability.  Guarantors sign the document based on relationships, a sense of obligation 
(giri), and representations the new employee will not cause problems.  If problems do arise, the expectation 
is that the employer and guarantor will negotiate a solution, and in practice they do, with the guarantor 
accepting some liability in some cases and not in others.  When courts have been confronted with claims, 
they have adjusted them, on a case-by-case basis, rendering specific terms indefinite.  According to 
Professor Kawashima, the Law Regarding Personal Guaranties was drafted and passed by the Ministry of 
Justice Civil Affairs section to reconcile this difference between the law and people's general perceptions of 
what it means to act as a guarantor.  Id.  
239
  Id.  Rōdō Kijun Hō [Labor Standards Act], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 89-90, translated in Ministry 
of Justice, Japanese Law Translation, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.  
240
  Labor Contract Act, supra note 204.  Article 7 states that if an employer informs the employee of 
reasonable rules of employment, those rules, unless modified in a separate writing, provide the “contents of 
the labor contract.”  Id.  Articles 9 et seq. codify the process and standards for “change to the contents of a 
labor contract based on rules of employment.”  Id. 
241
  Tokyō Rōdōkyoku [Tokyo Labor Bureau], Shūgyō Kisoku no Sakusei Todokede, http://tokyo-
roudoukyoku.jsite.mhlw.go.jp/hourei_seido_tetsuzuki/roudoukijun_keiyaku/s-kisoku.html (last visited June 
4, 2012).   
242
  Id.  Articles 9 & 10 of the Labor Contract Act provide a framework for the employer to change the 
work rules without the consent of representatives of the work place.  Article 9 precludes, absent consent, a 
change to the work rules adversely that affects employees unless that change satisfies Article 10.  Article 
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Standard work rules contain extensive terms covering hiring and 
probation; requirements for the employee’s personal guarantors; terms 
covering transfer and leave; retirement and dismissals; work hours, breaks, 
and holidays; pregnancy and childcare leave; rules of conduct; use of 
company assets; confidentiality requirements; safety and hygiene rules; 
standards and procedures for disciplining employees; and compensation for 
work-place injuries.
243
  Separate rules setting out standards and procedures 
for disbursing salary and benefits are commonly incorporated by reference 
into the Work Rules.
244
  
B.  Courts and the Rights to Dismiss 
This “employment contract,” addressing everything from uniforms to 
lunchtime, might be a hundred pages long.  Their standards of conduct and 
dismissal provisions, however, are noteworthy because the rights and 
obligations enumerated are, again, just the starting point.   
An employer’s right to dismiss an employee under the Work Rules is 
commonly divided into “ordinary dismissal” and “disciplinary dismissal.”245  
Discussion of both types, and related case law, follows.  Once again 
employers bargain for more than the law permits, until the courts intervene 
and specific rights are replaced by reasonableness and “the common sense of 
society.”   
1. Ordinary Dismissal  
Standard bases in the Work Rules for ordinary dismissal include 1) 
when it is determined that the employee is unable to bear the work because 
of a physical or mental disability; 2) when it is determined that the 
employee’s ability or work record is inadequate such that employment is not 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 provides that if notice is given and if the change to the rules is reasonable “in light of the extent of the 
disadvantage to be incurred by the worker, the need for changing the working conditions, the 
appropriateness of the contents of the changed rules of employment, the status of negotiations with a labor 
union or the like, or any other circumstances pertaining to the change to the rules of employment, the 
working conditions that constitute the contents of a labor contract shall be in accordance with such changed 
rules of employment.”  Labor Contract Act, supra note 205.  The ability of the representative of the 
majority of the employees in the workplace to influence changes in the workplace depends largely on 
employer/employee relationships.  Labor bureaus will not reject filing of changes to the work rules because 
of objections lodged by employee representatives.  Challenges to the validity of those changes require 
filing a complaint with a labor tribunal or the courts.  See, e.g., Japan Institute for Labor Policy and 
Training, Rōdō Mondai Q & A (Kaiseiban), available at http://www.jil.go.jp/rodoqa/05_kisoku/05-
Q01.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).  
243
  NOBUNORI ISHIZAKI ET AL., SHŪGYŌ KISOKU NO HŌRITSU JITSUMU 660-701 (2010); see also 
Work Rules, supra note 206.   
244
  ISHIZAKI ET AL., supra note 243, at 680. 
245
  Id.; Work Rules, supra note 202. 
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appropriate; 3) when there is no improvement after warnings regarding 
unsatisfactory work attitudes; 4) when the employee fails to cooperate and 
adversely impacts work done by other employees; 5) when there is 
downsizing of the enterprise or other unavoidable business necessity; and 6) 
when there are other conditions evidencing a lack of qualifications to work 
as a company employee.
246
 
Setting aside the first criterion and what it says about disability law in 
Japan,
247
 the remaining criteria suggest that if you don’t do your job or if the 
employer doesn’t need you, the employer can fire you.  The courts, however, 
have long suggested something different.  They have for decades 
substantively reviewed and regularly invalidated ordinary dismissals by the 
employer.
248
   
While the Civil Code provides that when no term is fixed either party 
may terminate the employment relationship on two weeks’ notice, 249  in 
1975, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he exercise of the employer’s right to 
dismiss shall be null and void as an abuse of right if the dismissal is not 
based on reasonable cause or is viewed as improper from the general 
viewpoint of society.”250  Subsequent courts have held that “even when there 
is a reason for ordinary dismissal, the employer is not always permitted to 
dismiss the employee.”251   
More recent cases tell the same story.  In 2006, Kitagawa Sangyō, a 
kitchenware manufacturer, fired a regular employee after eight years with 
the company.
252
  A Tokyo District Court reviewed the dismissal and found 
that the employee had violated company work rules, repeatedly.  The 
                                                     
246
  ISHIZAKI ET AL., supra note 243, at 667; see also KANO, supra note 196, at 234; Work Rules, 
supra note 203; compare Ryuichi Yamakawa, From Security to Mobility? Changing Aspects of Japanese 
Dismissal Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 486 (Daniel H. Foote 2007).   
247
  See, e.g., Jun Nakagawa & Peter Blank, Future of Disability Law in Japan: Employment and 
Accommodation, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 173 (2010). 
248
  See, e.g., Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service of–
Stability?, supra note 196.  
249
  Civil Code, supra note 174, at art. 627. 
250
  See Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 487.  The abuse of rights doctrine was codified in Article 1(3) 
of Civil Code in 1947, and states that ‘[n]o abuse of rights shall be permitted.”  Its origins date back to 
decisions by the Supreme Court of Cassation during the Taisho period and before that to the reception of 
France law during the Meiji Reformation.  Kazuaki Sono & Yasuhiro Fujioka, The Role of the Abuse of 
Right Doctrine in Japan, 35 LA. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1975).  In 1919, in Shimizu v. Japan, the Supreme 
Court of Cassation enunciated the doctrine, finding the National Railway had abused a legal right to run 
trains through a switching yard, when it did so in a manner that resulted in pollution that killed a famous 
pine tree located nearby.  Id. at 1041.  
251
  Shioda v. Kōchi Broadcasting Company, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 1977) trans. by 
Kazuo Sugeno, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 62, at 545, 546. 
252
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 18, 2007, 947 RŌDŌ HANREI 23, translated by Elizabeth 
Cantu, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CODES, CASES, AND COMMENTARY 
641 (2d ed. 2012).   
JUNE 2013 ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN 633 
employee had, inter alia, erased email data from a company computer and 
lied about it; misrepresented his title and authority in correspondence with 
suppliers; obstructed attempts to gather related correspondence; and 
slandered other employees.
253
  The court, however, found these acts “are not 
so abhorrently blameworthy that they could justify firing an employee.”254  
The court pointed out that no prior disciplinary action had been taken against 
the employee; the employer had known about the violations for over a year 
before dismissing him, which suggested that they did not deem the 
violations serious; and the employee had committed no further “particularly 
troublesome deeds.” 255   As a result, despite the work rule violations 
expressly providing for termination of the employee, the dismissal “lacks 
any objective reasonableness and, is improper according to the sense of 
society, and is invalid.”256 
The courts treat poor performance similarly to work rule violations.  
More often than not, it is simply not enough to justify dismissal.
257
  In 1999, 
a Tokyo District Court reviewed Sega Enterprises’ dismissal of an employee 
after eight years of employment.
258
  After years of problems, the employee’s 
boss told him to look for work elsewhere in the company; citing attitude 
problems, no other department would take him.  Sega then dismissed the 
employee for “deficient work ability and no prospect for improvement.”259  
The court, on review, recognized numerous attempts to find work the 
employee could perform, and that the employee’s evaluations ranked in the 
bottom ten percent of the company.
260
  But the court ruled that simply 
because the worker was below average did not justify termination.
261
  The 
employer had an obligation to provide additional, comprehensive education 
and instruction because there appeared to be room to improve the 
employee’s performance.  The court found no evidence of comprehensive 
education and instruction, and, as a result, insufficient evidence to support a 
finding of “deficient work ability and no prospect for improvement.”262   
                                                     
253
  Id. at 642-49.   
254
  Id. at 652. 
255
  Id.   
256
  Id.   
257
  RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌKIJUN TO JITSUMU 128 (Rōdō Hanrei Kenkyūkai ed., 2010). 
258
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Oct. 15, 1999, Hei 11 (Yo) no. 21055, 1050 HANREI TAIMUZU 
129, 770; see also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 258, at 128-129; NIHON 
RŌDŌ BENGODAN, (Ikensho) Kaiko Ru-ru nado no Shuchi ni Kan Suru Ikensho (Sept. 26, 2003), available 
at http://roudou-bengodan.org/proposal/detail/gen030926a.php.   
259
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Oct. 15, 1999, supra note 258 at 133-35. 
260
  Id. at 137.   
261
  Id. at 138. 
262
  Id. 
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In 2001, a Tokyo District Court reviewed an insurance company’s 
termination of an employee for “conspicuously poor work abilities.”263  The 
court found that employment until retirement is presumed under Japan’s 
employment system and, as a result, dismissal of a regular employee based 
on poor work performance extremely disadvantageous to the worker.
264
  The 
court held that real obstruction or damage to the business or its operations is 
necessary, or there must be a risk of significant damage such that the 
employer must remove the employee from the company.  There can be no 
prospect for improvement, no extenuating circumstances, and no possibility 
for transfer or demotion.
265
  The court in this case found the employees’ 
termination a part of the company’s efforts to restructure, rather than based 
on significantly poor work performance, and voided it as an abuse of 
rights.
266
 
Courts affirm dismissals, but it takes a lot.  Tokyo Marine Insurance 
Company dismissed an employee who spent years on sick leave and, while 
not on sick leave, came to work late and repeatedly failed to follow 
instructions, requiring significant company time spent correcting errors.  
Pursuant to its Work Rules, it found “remarkably poor work ability so as to 
hinder company performance” and terminated the employee.267  He sued, 
arguing that his performance was not so bad as to “disrupt proper business 
function.” 268   In 2000, a Tokyo District Court found that was not the 
standard, but, even if it was, this employee’s performance presented a risk of 
“disrupting proper business function” and no abuse of rights as a result.269   
Courts that have found below average work skills a sufficient basis to 
terminate the employee emphasize the extensive efforts by the employer to 
avoid termination.  In 2001, a Tokyo District Court reviewed the dismissal of 
an employee hired as an “installation specialist” at the consulting firm 
Proudfoot Japan, Ltd.
270
  The court found the employee in his first year and a 
half worked on five projects and for four did not possess the average level of 
skills required, and that his gaining the necessary skills was unlikely.  The 
                                                     
263
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Aug. 10, 2001, Hei (Yo) no. 21081, 1116 HANREI TAIMUZU 148-
149; see also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 126-27; NIHON RŌDŌ 
BENGODAN, supra note 258.   
264
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Aug. 10, 2001, supra note 263, at 152-53. 
265
  Id.  
266
  Id. at 155-56. 
267
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], July 28, 2000, Hei (wa) no. 19747, 797 RŌDŌ HANREI 65; see 
also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 130. 
268
  Tokyo Dist. Ct. July 28, 2000, supra note 267. 
269
  Id. 
270
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Apr. 26, 2000, Hei (wa) no. 6384, 789 RŌDŌ HANREI 21; see also 
RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 132. 
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employer and employee spent three months negotiating different work 
responsibilities, i.e. another job, but were unable to reach an agreement, after 
which the employee was terminated.  The court found an “objectively 
reasonable basis” for the dismissal and no abuse of rights.271   
The end result is that while the Work Rules clearly provide the 
employer with the right to dismiss bad employees, the courts regularly 
modify that right.  They substantively review disciplinary decisions and 
frequently invalidate them.  The Work Rules are a detailed employment 
contract specifically allocating rights and responsibilities, but they present 
only the first layer of legal norms governing the relationship.  The second 
layer, available after invoking the legal process, applies equity and reviews 
whether the dismissal was “justified” or “an abuse of rights.”  
2. Economic Dismissal  
The work rules cited above, and most others, reserve a blanket right to 
dismiss based on economic necessity, in other words to restructure.  The 
courts have limited that right as well.  Economic dismissals, categorized as a 
type of “ordinary dismissal,” must satisfy four “requirements” or 
“factors”. 272   There must be a showing of 1) necessity to reduce the 
workforce; 2) good faith efforts by the employer to avoid dismissals; 3) 
reasonable criteria in selecting employees to be discharged; and 4) 
reasonable efforts to explain and obtain the consent of the trade union or 
workers regarding the dismissals.
273
  
Early cases and commentary interpreted the above as “requirements”, 
all of which must be met in order to justify dismissal.  The Tokyo High 
Court’s 1979 Tōyō Oxygen Company decision defines this approach.274  
Following extended losses, Tōyō Oxygen announced its decision to shut 
down a division and dismiss the employees.  It negotiated retirement 
allowances with the unions, which the majority of division employees 
rejected.  The employees filed suit alleging an abuse of the right to dismiss.
 
275
 
The district court found proof of an economic need to close the 
division, but a failure to prove that the process was “socially reasonable” 
                                                     
271
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 26, 2000, supra note 271.   
272
  Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 487; RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 
257, at 137. 
273
  Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 487-88. 
274
  Tokyo Kōsai [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 29, 1979, Sho 51 (Ne) no. 1028, 401 HANREI TAIMUZU 41 
trans. by Kazuo Sugeno, reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 62, at 547. 
275
  Id. 
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(shakai teki sōtōsei) and found for the plaintiffs.276  The Tokyo High Court 
affirmed the dismissals, but, in doing so, confirmed that such dismissals 
must satisfy three substantive requirements and a separate procedural 
requirement:   
First, the closing . . . must be based upon unavoidable necessity 
from the viewpoint of a reasonable management of the 
enterprise . . . . Second, dismissal due to the closure . . . should 
not be arbitrary on the employer’s part. Such a dismissal can be 
held not arbitrary only if there is no room for transferring the 
employees . . . Third, the selection of the actual retirees should 
be based on objective and reasonable criteria.
277
 
The court then required procedural fairness: “regardless of any labor 
agreements . . . proceeding without the acceptance of the union or without 
sufficient negotiation regarding the dismissal, or implementing dismissals 
that violate good faith procedural principles . . . will void the dismissal.”278  
Recent courts have relaxed this standard, requiring only that these 
“factors” be considered as part of “the totality of the circumstances.”279  In 
1999, National Westminster Bank closed its trade finance division and, after 
determining that there was no other position suitable for plaintiff’s skills, 
dismissed him.  In reviewing the dismissal, the Tokyo District Court 
characterized the above standard as: “a categorization of factors to consider 
in determining whether a termination . . . amounts to an abuse of the right of 
dismissal.  They are not intended as discrete legal requirements.”  Decisions 
regarding dismissal are “to be made examining in its totality the individual, 
concrete circumstances of each case.”280    
Applying this standard, the court found no abuse of rights.   As 
available positions at the bank all required expertise that plaintiff lacked, it 
was “practically impossible” to continue the employee in his current position 
at his current salary, and his dismissal was “rational” as a result.  The court 
focused on the bank’s “good faith efforts.” The bank gave due consideration 
to “living maintenance” (seikatsu iji) by providing a substantial retirement 
package and unlimited access to re-employment services,
281
 and it made 
repeated efforts to explain and gain acceptance to the dismissal by 
                                                     
276
  Id.  
277
  Id.; RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 138-39. 
278
  Tokyo Kōsai, Oct. 29, 1979, supra note 274, at 43. 
279
  Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 501; RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 
257, at 140, 143; Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] January 21, 2000, Hei 11 (yo) no. 21217, 782 RŌDŌ 
HANREI 23. 
280
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jan. 21, 2000, supra note 279. 
281
  Id. 
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participating in numerous “group negotiations” (dantai kōshō) with the 
employee’s union.282   
The court showed newfound deference to the employer, finding that 
“restructuring is intended to strengthen competitiveness,” and this “type of 
business decision relating to operational planning is one based on a high 
level of technical expertise,” which “should be respected.” 283   But even 
where dismissal is justified, the court weighed this deference against 
disruption to the workers’ livelihood and held that sufficient consideration 
must be given to the affected workers’ living needs for the near future; 
assistance with finding new employment provided; and negotiations 
conducted to gain the acceptance of the affected workers.
284
  “Good faith 
efforts in dealing with the restructuring are required.”285   
Commentators now suggest that there two different paradigms used 
for reviewing economic dismissal, the “four requirements” theory and “four 
factors” theory.286  Whether four requirements or four factors, what one finds 
is another discrepancy between the private, first level ordering that 
contractually defines the employer-employee relationship and reserves a 
blanket right of termination to the employer, and second level ordering that 
involves court review to determine whether the dismissals were justified and 
“good faith efforts” made to avoid restructuring and mitigate its effects.  
Restructuring limited to economic necessity and the necessity to mitigate its 
effects on employees are nowhere to be found in the Work Rules; they are 
found in the case law.
287
   
3. Disciplinary Dismissal  
The Work Rules also commonly provide a list of grounds for 
disciplinary dismissals, or termination for cause.  The employer may dismiss 
for cause for, inter alia, falsification of business reports adversely impacting 
the business; violation of confidentiality requirements; theft or misuse of 
                                                     
282
  Id.  The employer negotiated with the employee and his union seven times over the course of three 
months regarding the employee’s termination and retirement package. 
283
  Id.   
284
  Id. 
285
  Id. 
286
  RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 138-42. 
287
  Commentators have suggested that the degree of financial difficulty necessary to justify 
restructuring is determined on a case-by-case basis, with reference to Toyo Oxygen’s standard of 
“unavoidable necessity based on rational management of the company.”  This requires something less than 
possible bankruptcy and something more than simple business need.  Id. at 141. Similarly, the “duty to 
avoid dismissal” involves a case-by-case review examining steps take prior to restructuring including 
implementation of hiring freezes, furlough days, negotiated pay cuts and other attempts to reduce operating 
costs, soliciting voluntary retirement, and job placement services.  Id. at 142.  
638 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 3 
 
company property; accepting bribes or bribing public officials; bad faith, 
egregious violation of a company directive or rule; intentional acts resulting 
in significant damage to the company; and a catch-all of “other inappropriate 
conduct of a similar magnitude.” 288   The bar for disciplinary dismissal, 
however, is high. 
The starting point is the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Kōchi 
Broadcasting.
289
  There, a radio announcer overslept twice, and lied about it 
the second time.
290
  His employer dismissed him, and he filed suit arguing 
dismissal was too severe a punishment and constituted an abuse of the right 
of dismissal.  The courts, at each stage, voided the dismissal.  The Supreme 
Court found that a “dismissal could be null and void as an abuse of the right 
of dismissal when the dismissal is extremely unreasonable and not to be 
admitted to be appropriate based on the common sense of society depending 
on the actual circumstances of the individual case.”  For the newscaster, 
“[j]udging from these circumstances, to dismiss plaintiff is rather too severe 
and tends to lack reasonableness.  Thus the dismissal could possibly be 
regarded as inappropriate in the common sense of society.”291   
The Supreme Court in 1977 explicitly acknowledged the consensus of 
society may conflict with the Work Rules: “[t]he employer may not always 
discharge workers even when there exists a fact that constitutes reason for 
dismissal stipulated under work rules.  If a dismissal is excessively 
unreasonable and impermissible from the viewpoint of general society, such 
a dismissal shall be null and void as an abuse of right.”292 
More recent lower courts have affirmed disciplinary dismissals, but 
they do so following an exhaustive review and it takes more than violating 
the Work Rules.  In 2002, a Tokyo District Court reviewed a claim for 
wrongful termination brought by an employee hired as a newspaper 
reporter.
293
  After ten years of inaccurate articles, problems with sources and 
colleagues, and missed deadlines, the newspaper transferred him to HR.
294
  
In his new assignment, he continued to make mistakes and refused to follow 
instructions, for which his employer reprimanded him.  He began to leave 
early, for which his employer docked his pay, and again refused to follow 
                                                     
288
  ISHIZAKI ET AL., supra note 243, at 687. 
289
  See, e.g., RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 178; Nihon Rōdō 
Bengodan, supra note 258. 
290
  Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Jan. 31, 1977, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17 trans. by Kazuo Sugeno 
reprinted in MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 62, at 545, 546.  
291
  Id.   
292
  Yamakawa, supra note 246, at 486. 
293
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 22, 2002, Hei 11 (wa) no. 4526, 830 RŌDŌ HANREI 52; see 
also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 181. 
294
  Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 22, 2002, supra note 293. 
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instructions, for which the newspaper suspended him.  After his suspension, 
he simply stopped coming to work.  The employer emailed, faxed, and sent 
certified letters, requesting that he submit a leave of absence form or return 
to work; he refused.  In 2002, they fired him.
295
  The employee argued this 
was an abuse of rights.  The court focused on the repeated absences and 
repeated refusal to follow instructions.  It found the employee committed 
gross violations of the work rules, and the employer made numerous 
attempts to correct the situation before terminating him.
296
  In its totality, this 
justified the employer’s termination of the employee.297   
In 2005, the Fukuoka High Court reviewed a wrongful termination 
claim in which a driving school instructor used a company laptop to frequent 
dating websites.
298
  Over the course of four months, he sent approximately 
800 messages, one-half during work hours, and posted solicitations for sex.  
He used his company email address for this, and the postings were publicly 
accessible.  After discovering the activity, and in light of previous 
disciplinary problems, the company asked him to resign.  He refused.  The 
company suspended him, and, after a meeting of their disciplinary 
committee, fired him.
299
  The employer sued alleging an “abuse of rights,” 
and the Fukuoka High Court found that the employee had violated his 
obligation to work during work hours and recklessly damaged the reputation 
of the company, for which termination was appropriate.
300
   
What is remarkable is that this was a close call: the district court 
found the termination was an abuse of rights.  It found that most of the 
messages sent were harmless; the solicitations for sex limited in number; and 
the instructor had not been negligent in his teaching or driving instruction.  
The court observed that the company had no computer use policy, and the 
messages had not been the subject of any complaints or attention by the 
media until after suit was filed, such that there was no real harm to the 
reputation of the company.  The district court found that the disciplinary 
dismissal was “a little too severe” and an abuse of the right of dismissal.301 
In order for disciplinary termination to be deemed justified by the 
courts, practitioners suggest that the dereliction of duty must be gross, 
continue over a period of time, and the termination proceeded by progressive 
                                                     
295
  Id.  
296
  Id.   
297
  Id. 
298
  Fukuoka Kōsai [Fukuoaka High Ct.] Sept. 14, 2007, Hei 19 (ne) no. 76, 1223 HANREI TAIMUZU 
188; see also RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 184. 
299
  Fukuoka Kousai [Fukuoaka High Ct.] Sept. 14, 2007, supra note 298, at 188, 190-91. 
300
  Id. at 191. 
301
  Fukuoaka Chisai Kurume Shibu [Fukuoka Dist. Ct. Kurume Sec.] Dec. 17, 2006, Hei 15 (wa) no. 
375, 1223 HANREI TAIMUZU 192, 197-98. 
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sanctions and repeated opportunities to improve.
302
  All of this becomes part 
of the employer’s “duty to make efforts to avoid termination.”303  While the 
Work Rules state that if an employee fails to perform or performs poorly, the 
employer can fire him or her, if challenged, the courts impose a duty on the 
employer to avoid dismissal.  Repeated attempts to retrain, find work that 
the employee can do, and sanction progressively are necessary to avoid an 
“abuse of rights.”304   
C.  Employment Law Conclusion 
These judicial standards have been codified.  Amendments in 2003 to 
Japan’s Labor Standards Act state “[a] dismissal shall be null and void as an 
abuse of right if the dismissal is not based on reasonable cause or is viewed 
as improper from the general viewpoint of society.” 305   Japan’s Labor 
Contract Act, effective 2008, reiterates this:  “[a] dismissal shall, if it lacks 
objectively reasonable grounds and is not considered to be appropriate in 
general societal terms, be treated as an abuse of right and be invalid.”306  
Disciplinary action, in general, may be voided, “if such disciplinary action 
lacks objectively reasonable grounds and is not found to be appropriate in 
general societal terms in light of the characteristics and mode of the act 
committed by the worker pertaining to such disciplinary action and any other 
circumstances.”307 
The end result is a set of legal norms, first enunciated by the courts, 
now codified, that provide the courts with a means to review employer 
action and impose equitable standards, standards based on the totality of the 
circumstances and “general societal terms.”  Those standards are applied, 
                                                     
302
  RŌDŌ HANREI NI MIRU KAIKŌ KIJUN TO JITSUMU, supra note 257, at 187. 
303
  Id. at 184, 187. 
304
  Levels of discipline vary but commonly include letters of reprimand, which require submission of 
letters of apology; reduction in pay; suspension from work; demotion; dismissal for cause; and disciplinary 
dismissal.  See ISHIZAKI ET AL., supra note 243, at 684.  Steps before dismissal, demotion and or a cut in 
pay, based on poor performance receive similar review by the courts.  See Hiroyuki Morisaki & Hitomi 
Takanori, Hanrei ni miru Mondai Shain Taiō: Dai Ni Kai: Kōkaku, BUJINESU HŌMU, Feb. 2010, at 106.  
The basic standard enunciated by the courts states: “[e]xercise of the rights of personnel management, 
including demotion, fall basically within the discretionary business judgment of the employer, and will not 
be deemed illegal unless the decision is remarkably deficient based on the common sense of society.”  In 
determining whether the employer has exceeded the discretion afforded, the demotion’s “business and 
organizational necessity; culpability of the employee in terms of degree, abilities, suitability, or other 
deficiencies, and its degree; the disadvantage to be suffered by the employee and degree; the promotion and 
demotion practices at the company, and the like should all be considered in their totality.”  Id  
305
  Labor Standards Act, supra note 239, at art. 18-2, para. 1.  
306
  Labor Contract Act, supra note 204, art. 16. 
307
  Id. art. 15. 
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however, only after application and challenge to a very different set of 
norms.   
First level ordering in the hiring documents, the Covenant on 
Employment and Personal Guarantee, state that the employee is responsible 
for any damage he or she causes the company.  Second level ordering, by the 
courts, limits that.  First level ordering in the Work Rules provides that 
employers can fire an employee who doesn’t perform or is no longer 
necessary and demand indemnification for any damages.  Second level 
ordering limits that.    
Some practitioners suggest that “a good HR manager can get rid of a 
lot of employees” by “convincing them that their retirement is inevitable.”308  
But they are convinced out, rather than forced out.  Bargaining happens not 
“in the shadow of the law,” but in the shadow of detailed contracts.  After the 
dispute escalates and the power of the courts is threatened or invoked, then 
the more ambiguous norms of the courts apply.   
IV. LAW & NUCLEAR ENERGY IN JAPAN   
Environmental law and more specifically the legal infrastructure 
regulating the Japanese nuclear industry is complex and provides a public 
law example of this layering of the law.  Wide-ranging regulations and 
various regulators oversee the planning, construction, and operation of a 
nuclear reactor, but all of this leads to the narrow end of a funnel at which 
the prefectural governor and local city mayors sit.  Local government 
officials decide, based on a “gentlemen’s agreement,” whether or not a 
reactor operates.      
A. Regulating Nuclear Energy 
This section of the paper is not about March 11 or its causes,
309
 but it 
does introduce the law governing nuclear energy in Japan and that 
introduction suggests a complicated formal legal structure followed by a 
layer of informal norms.  “Western” norms and practice have not replaced 
“traditional” norms and practice as Professor Kawashima suggested; 
“western” norms and practice, meaning clear delineation of rights and 
obligations, operate in conjunction with “traditional” consensus-based 
                                                     
308
  Interview with registered foreign lawyer (Tokyo 2012) (on file with author). 
309
  Professor Ramseyer offers an explanation: he points to the corporate form and the moral hazard 
that arises from liability capped at the fire-sale value of power companies’ net assets.  J Mark Ramseyer, 
Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. 
L. 457 (2012) [hereinafter Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines]. 
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norms.  A discussion of the basic statutory framework, regulatory structure, 
licensing and inspection system, and then judicial and local government 
review follows. 
1. Statutory Framework  
Regulation of the nuclear industry in Japan starts with the Basic 
Nuclear Energy Act.
310
  First passed in 1955, it establishes a framework for 
nuclear energy research, development, and use.
311
  It limits each to peaceful 
use and requires establishment of safety measures and international 
cooperation.
312
  In pursuit of “peaceful use” and “securing safety,” the act 
establishes three basic principles for the industry: independence, openness, 
and civil, as opposed to military, use.
313
   
Within this basic framework, the Nuclear Substances, Nuclear Fuel 
and Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act (“Regulation Act”) 314  and the 
Prevention of Radiation Injuries due to Radioisotopes Act (“Radiation 
Injuries Prevention Act”)315 are the primary technical statutes.316  The former 
regulates commercial nuclear reactors producing electricity; creates a 
regulatory framework for their establishment and construction; provides 
authority for safety regulations, licensing, and inspections; and establishes a 
framework for imposing penalties for noncompliance.
317
  The Regulation 
                                                     
310
  Genshiryoku Kihon Hō [Basic Nuclear Energy Act], Law No. 186 of 1955, available at 
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; see also Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni no 
Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, at II-1; KENKICHI HIROSE, WAKARIYASUI GENSHIRYOKU KISEI 
KANKEI NO HŌREI TEBIKI 6 (2011). 
311
  Genshiryoku Kihon Hō [Basic Nuclear Energy Act], supra note 310, arts. 1-2; see also Kantei, 
supra note 310; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 6-8. 
312
  Basic Nuclear Energy Act, supra note 310; see also Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no 
Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 313 at II-1; HIROSE, supra note 313. 
313
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 6; LDP and Komeito additions to the June 2012 Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Establishment Act revised the Basic Nuclear Energy Act so that it now states that nuclear 
energy is to be “used with the goal of contributing to the security of Japan.”  Cabinet members have 
suggested this language does not change the three principles of independence, openness, and civilian use, 
but the change does reflect thinking by many that Japan’s civilian nuclear industry operates as military 
deterrent.  Genshiryoku Kihon Hō: Mokuteki ni ‘Anzen Hoshō’ Kisei Hō no Fusoku De, MAINICHI 
SHIMBUN (June 21, 2012),  http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20120622k0000m010083000c.html; Japan’s 
military defense chief Morimoto sees nuclear plants as a deterrent, favors 25% option for energy mix, THE 
JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20120906b4.html. 
314
  Kakugenryō Busshitsu, Kakunenryōbusshitsu Oyobi Genshiro no Kisei ni Kan Suru Hōrits 
[Nuclear Substances, Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act (“Regulation Act”)], Law No. 166 
of 1957, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. 
315
  Hōshasei Dōi Genso Nado ni Yoru Hōshasen Shōgai no Bōshi ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Law on the 
Preventions of Radiation Injuries due to Radioisotopes (“Radiation Injuries Prevention Act”)], Law No. 
167 of 1957, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S32/S32HO167.html. 
316
  HIROSE, supra note 310 at 8. 
317
  The Regulation Act is broken down based on activity, e.g., refinement, processing, nuclear 
reactors, storage, re-processing.  With regard to reactor operation, Chapter 4 of the Act regulates the 
JUNE 2013 ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN 643 
Act’s stated goals are comprehensive regulation that prevents accidents and 
protects public safety; protects fissile material and public security; and 
complies with international treaty obligations regulating the peaceful use of 
nuclear materials.
318
 
The Radiation Injuries Prevention Act establishes a regulatory 
framework for handling all radioactive materials.
319
  Incorporating 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (“ICRP”) standards, 
the act regulates the registration, sale, lease, transportation, handling, and 
disposal of radioactive materials.
320
  It establishes standards for the 
placement of facilities utilizing radioactive materials, their construction, 
maintenance, and inspections.
321
  It establishes usage standards, exposure 
standards, industry standards, inspections relating to industry workers and 
health maintenance requirements, record-keeping requirements, ongoing 
education requirements, as well as standards for transportation and handling 
of radioactive materials.
322
  The law is supplemented by the Technical 
Standards for the Prevention of Radiation Injuries Act,
323
 which establishes a 
Radiation Deliberative Council that is tasked with developing standards for 
the prevention of radiation exposure injuries.
324
  Regulatory agencies 
promulgating related standards are required to consult this deliberative 
council,
325
 and ensure that the new standards incorporate those established 
under the Radiation Injuries Preventions Act.
326
 
                                                                                                                                                              
establishment and operation of reactors; Chapter 6 nuclear energy enterprises; Chapter 6(3) welding and 
other inspections; and Chapter 8 penalties for noncompliance.  Regulation Act, supra note 314; see also 
Kantei, supra note 310.  Rules based on the statute include, inter alia, the Rules Relating to the 
Establishment and Operation of Nuclear Reactors for Generating Electricity and Notice establishing 
Radiation Limits.  Id.   
318
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 30.  Regulated entities include refiners; processors; reactor operators; 
post-use storage, processing, and disposal operations.  Id. at 31.   
319
  Radiation Injuries Prevention Act, supra note 315. 
320
  Id.  See also Mombukagakusho [MEXT], Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Hou 
Taikei Ni Tsuite, available at, http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/anzenkakuho/1260977.htm 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2011).  Japan incorporates the ICRP radiation exposure standards, through its Law 
regarding Technical Standards for the Prevention of Radiation Injuries (Houshasen Shougai boushi no 
Gijutsu Teki Kijun ni Kan Suru Houritsu).  HIROSE, supra note 310 at 20, 23. 
321
  Radiation Injuries Prevention Act, supra note 315. 
322
  Id.  Article 6 requires operators to meet MEXT technical standards in order to obtain approval for 
construction and operation. 
323
  Hōshasei Shōgai Bōshi no Gijutsu teki Kijun ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Law on Technical Standards 
for the Prevention of Rational Injuries] Law No. 162 of 1958 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu) [Hōrei DB], 
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; HIROSE, supra note 313 at 22. 
324
  Law on Technical Standards for the Prevention of Rational Injuries, supra note 323, at art. 1.  The 
council, a shingikai, is housed within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(MEXT).  Id.   
325
  Id. at art. 6.   
326
  HIROSE, supra note 310 at 23; Radiation Injuries Prevention Act, supra note 315. 
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The Electricity Businesses Act (“Electricity Act”) provides 
comprehensive regulatory coverage of all power companies, and also 
regulates nuclear power plants.
327
  With regard to commercial nuclear 
reactors, the Electricity Act establishes separate design and construction 
guidelines, as well as an approval process for construction; pre-use 
inspections; and regular facility inspections.
328
  The result is that commercial 
nuclear power plants are subject to safety regulation drawn from both the 
Regulation Act and the Electricity Act, as well as ordinances, rules, and 
notices promulgated pursuant to these statutes.
329
    
These “basic” laws are supplemented by more specialized statutes, 
including the Basic Disaster Response Act (“Response Act”) 330  and the 
Compensation for Damages from Nuclear Energy Act (“Compensation 
Act”).331  The Response Act was passed in 1999, after employees improperly 
mixed fuel at the Tokaimura Nuclear Reprocessing facility and the fuel 
reached criticality, killing two employees and dispersing radiation into the 
surrounding area.
332
  The Response Act followed establishing additional 
operator requirements to prevent accidents, and providing authority for the 
government to issue nuclear emergency declarations, establish a nuclear 
accident response headquarters, and implement emergency measures.
333
    
                                                     
327
 Denki Jigyō Hō [Electricity Businesses Act], Law No. 170 of 1964 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu) 
[Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi; Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku 
Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, II-1. 
328
  Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310 at 
II-1.  Rules regulating the safety of nuclear reactors based on this statute include the Electricity Businesses 
Enforcement Rules, the Ordinance Defining Technical Standards for Energy Generating Nuclear Power 
Facilities, and the Technical Standards Relating on Levels of Radioactivity from Electricity Producing 
Nuclear Power Facilities.  Id. 
329
  HIROSE, supra note 310 at 9.  Cabinet Ordinances (Seirei), Ministerial Ordinances (Shōrei), and 
Notices (Kokuji) implement each of these basic statutes.  Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni 
no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, II-4, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/topics/ 
2011/pdf/02-shikumi.pdf (last visited March 6, 2012).  
330
  Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, 
supra note 310, at II-5.  HIROSE, supra note 310 at 19.  Following the JCO incident, the Nuclear Reactor 
Regulatory Act was revised to include additional safety guidelines and regulations implementing additional 
safety inspections for currently operating nuclear plants.  Id. at 20.  The Special Measures Law for 
Responding to Nuclear Disasters, enacted in 1999, supplements the Basic Disaster Response Act.  
Genshiryoku Saigai Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi Hō [Special Measures Law for Responding to Nuclear 
Disasters], Law No. 156 of 1999 (Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu [Hōrei DB]), available at, http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. 
331
  Genshiryoku Songai Baishō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Compensation for Damages from Nuclear 
Energy Act (“Compensation Act”)] Law No. 47 of 1961, Hōrei teikyō dēta shisutemu [Hōrei DB], 
available at, http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. 
332
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 19, 23.  Employees preparing fuel for its fast breeder reactor overfilled 
a mixing tank, which reached criticality.  See also NOBORU UTATSU, GENSHIRYŌ SONGAI BAISHŌ HŌRITSU 
MONDAI 84 (2012).   
333
  Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310 at 
II-5; HIROSE, supra note 310 at 19, 238.  
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Japan has not signed onto international agreements addressing liability 
for nuclear damage,
334
 but its Compensation Act establishes a domestic 
compensation framework.
335
  It creates a strict liability regime for “nuclear 
energy enterprises,”336 which covers “injuries arising from nuclear fission, 
nuclear radiation arising from nuclear materials, or other related toxic 
effects.”337  The strict liability is unlimited in scope, but it is limited to the 
operator, the nuclear energy enterprise.
338
  The act provides for rights of 
indemnity if the damage is caused by the intentional acts of a third party, but 
the operator remains liable.
339
  The stated purpose of the act is to facilitate 
payment of claims for compensation by eliminating the need for proof of 
negligence or intent; by eliminating the need to identify responsible parties; 
and by eliminating limits to those claims.
340
    
The Compensation Act requires all nuclear power plant operators to 
insure against risk.
341
  They do so primarily through private insurance with 
the Japanese Atomic Energy Insurance Pool, and secondarily with the 
government.
342
  The act mandates private insurance of ¥120 billion per 
reactor generating over 10,000 kilowatts.
343
  The Compensation Act, along 
with a separate Nuclear Energy Damage Compensation Indemnification 
Contract Act, also establishes a framework for “assistance” by the Japanese 
government to compensate claims (a) in excess of the above amount, or (b) 
for damage not covered because of force majeure.
344
  Both laws contemplate 
                                                     
334
  Hirose, supra note 310, at 246-47, 254.  Japan is not a signatory to the Paris Convention on Third 
Party Nuclear Liability or the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.  Id. 
335
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 246-47.  See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 28-29.  
336
  Compensation Act supra note 331, art. 3(1).  Art. 5(1) focuses liability on the operators and not 
the designer, constructor, or other actors.  Id.  See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 33. 
337
  Compensation Act supra note 331, at art. 2(2).  See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 33.   
338
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 247.    
339
  Compensation Act supra note 331, art. 5.   
340
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 248-49.  Plaintiffs must prove causation and damages.  Ramseyer, Why 
Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 466.  There are no provisions 
regarding how causation is established or what damages are covered.  Basic civil law principles apply.  See, 
e.g., Nichibenren, Tōkyō Denryoku ni Tai Suru Songai Baishō Seikyū Sōron 3-4, 
www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/ja/special_them/data/manual01.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).  Article 
18 of the Compensation Act establishes a Committee for the Resolution of Disputes relating to Damages 
from Nuclear Energy.  That committee functions as a mediation council; an investigatory body 
investigating damages; and a deliberative council establishing guidelines for determining the scope of 
damages covered.  Compensation Act, supra note 331, at art. 18.   
341
 Compensation Act supra note 331, art. 6.  See also UTATSU, supra note 332, at 31.  Pursuant to Art. 
33(2) of the Regulation Act, failure to properly insure could result in cancellation of the operating permit 
for the nuclear reactor.  Id.     
342
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 249.  Art. 8 requires a nuclear power injury liability compensation 
insurance contract.  Art. 10 requires a separate insurance compensation contract.  See UTATSU, supra note 
332, at 33.    
343
  Compensation Act supra note 331, at art. 7(1).  
344
  Id. at art. 10. 
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that the power company remains liable for any amounts paid by the 
government through low interest loans or other government assistance.
345
    
Force majeure changes things.  Nuclear power plant operators are 
strictly liable for any injuries causally related to radiation exposure, unless 
“the damage occurs as a result of societal unrest or an anomalous, massive 
natural calamity.” 346   Insurance contracts entered into with the Japanese 
Atomic Energy Insurance Pool, pursuant to Article 8 of the Compensation 
Act, specifically exclude accidents caused by earthquakes, tsunami, or 
volcanic eruptions, events covered by a supplemental insurance contact with 
the State.
347
  The Japanese government in that instance assumes liability.
348
    
After March 11, early debate focused on whether the force majeure 
exception to strict liability applied.  Commentators argued that it did not and 
that the exception to strict liability should be narrowly construed; they 
argued that for the force majeure exception to apply the events must be 
unforeseeable and without precedent in Japanese history.
349
  Historical 
records and simulations by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”) 
quickly disposed of any such suggestion.
350
  On May 10, 2011, TEPCO 
announced that it would provide compensation under the Compensation Act 
and applied for government assistance to do so.
351
   
In summary, numerous statutes and ordinances provide standards for 
radiation protection.  They establish regulatory frameworks for “inspections” 
by regulatory agencies; “examinations” by regulatory agencies; industry 
“maintenance standards;” industry “compliance standards;” emergency 
response procedures; administrative sanctions; and compensation for 
                                                     
345
  Id. at art. 16; UTATSU, supra note 332, at 34. 
346
  Compensation Act supra note 331, at art 3.  
347
  Id. at arts. 3, 8; Compensation Act Enforcement Rules Art. 2; UTATSU, supra note 332, at 34.   
348
   If the exculpatory clause doesn’t apply, the central government remains responsible for damages 
in excess of ¥120 billion and assistance as required under Compensation Act supra note 331,  art. 16(1).  If 
the exculpatory clause applies, the central government assumes primarily responsibility for relief and 
necessary measures.  Id. art. 17.  Scholars have suggested that operator liability based on tort principles 
remains a possibility.  Tadashi Otsuka, Kankyou Hou ni Okeru Hiyou Futan to Genshiryoku Songai 
Baishou, Hokkaido University Presentation Materials 35 (Sept. 3, 2012).  Presentation materials on file 
with author. 
349
  UTATSU, supra note 332, at 33-35.  Otsuka, supra note 348, at 32-33.  
350
  Reiji Yoshida, Probe poised to take Tepco to task, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 7, 2011; see also 
Kazuaki Nagata, New atomic regulator launches, vowing no more disasters, THE JAPAN TIMES Sept. 20, 
2012.  Scholars have described March 11 as a “high-damage, high-probability event.”  Ramseyer, Why 
Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 457, 479, 484. 
351
  UTATSU, supra note 332, at 36.  Following March 11, the Diet passed the Nuclear Energy 
Damages Compensation Assistance Organization Act, with the organization funded by government and the 
nine nuclear power plant operators and three related entities.  In August 26, 2011, the Diet also passed the 
“Special Law Concerning Environmental Pollution arising from the Release of Radiation from the Nuclear 
Reactor Accident accompanying the 2011 March 11 Tohoku Region Pacific Ocean Earthquake.”  See 
Otsuka, supra note 348, at 59. 
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damages.
352
  Primary attempts at ordering, based on black letter law, 
establish a complex statutory regime; its complexity matched only by the 
complexity of the regulatory structure implementing it.    
2. Regulating Nuclear Energy  
There are a hodge-podge of ministries, commissions, and agencies 
that have regulated the nuclear industry in Japan.
353
  As shown in the chart in 
Appendix A, the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (“METI”), the 
Ministry of Education, Science, Technology, and Sports (“MEXT”), and 
their predecessors, along with affiliated entities and the Cabinet Office all 
played central roles up until September 2012.
354
  
Safety regulation of commercial reactors started with the Resource 
Energy Division at the former Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry.
355
  In 2001, as part of broader administrative restructuring, METI 
was created and along with it the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
(“NISA”), an external bureau staffed with approximately 300 employees, 
affiliated with METI’s Resource Energy Division.356  Prior to September 
2012, METI held principal responsibility for the regulation of commercial 
nuclear reactors in Japan, as well as responsibility for promoting nuclear 
energy.
357
  Pursuant to a grant of authority in METI’s Establishment Law, 
NISA conducted the actual evaluation of construction applications, 
construction licensing, pre-use and other inspections, and advised METI on 
decisions relating to regulatory activities.
358
   
                                                     
352
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 11. 
353
 Yuka Hayashi & Chester Dawson, Japanese Struggle with Shape of Nuclear Regulation, WALL ST. 
J., March 25, 2012,(“[o]versight has also been fragmented”); Tatsujiro Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru 
‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai—Beikoku Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai wo Sōzai Toshite, 4 SHAKAI 
GIJUTSU KENKYŪ RONBUSHU 161, 167 (Dec. 2006). 
354
 The June 20, 2012 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Establishment Act created an independent 
regulatory commission designed to streamline, and improve, regulation.  Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai Secchi 
Hō [Nuclear Regulatory Commission Establishment Act], Law No. 47 of 2012 Hōrei teikyō de-ta 
shisutemu [Hōrei DB]), available at, http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. 
355
  The Nuclear Energy Policy Section for the Electricity and Gas Division oversaw public relations, 
research, safety, international cooperation, disposal, investigations, and technology related to nuclear 
energy.  Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 161, 
166.  
356
 Id. at 167; Research Organization for Information, Science and Technology (“RIST”), Hatsudenyō 
Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō (11-02-01-01) at 1, available at http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/ 
dat_detail.php?Title_Key=11-02-01-01 [hereinafter RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no 
Gaiyō]; Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, 
supra note 310, at II-5. 
357
  Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at 
II-5.   
358
 Id.; RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 1. 
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In 2003, as part of efforts to ensure independence from the nuclear 
industry, the Japanese government established the Japan Nuclear Energy 
Safety Organization (“JNES”), a public corporation tasked with developing 
independent technical expertise with which to analyze and evaluate the 
safety of commercial nuclear power generators.
359
  Staffed with 
approximately 400 employees, JNES worked with NISA to provide expertise 
relating to safety standards and inspections.  It also directly conducted 
inspections of some nuclear facilities.
360
 
Prior to September 2012, MEXT regulated experimental and research 
nuclear facilities, and it provided general environmental and radiation 
monitoring for all facilities.
361
  The Regulation Act provided for MEXT 
oversight over experimental reactors and fuels
 
and tasked MEXT with 
ensuring compliance with international obligations.
362
  The Response Act 
outlined MEXT’s role in responding to nuclear accidents, and the Radiation 
Injury Prevention Act authorized MEXT to implement regulations relating to 
the release of radioactive materials.
363
  The Science & Technology, 
Academic Policy & Safety Division within MEXT maintained separate 
offices dealing with radiation regulation; nuclear regulation; environmental 
accident response; compensation measures, and international nuclear safety 
issues.
364
    
At the same time, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (“JAEC”) 
and the Nuclear Safety Commission (“NSC”) operated as independent 
commissions within the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. 365   Since its 
inception in 1956, the JAEC has been tasked with establishing national 
policy “for the promotion of research, development, and utilization of 
                                                     
359
  Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 161, 
167. 
360
  Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at 
II-3; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 17; Tatsujiro Suzuki et al., Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei ni Okeru Dai Sansha 
Kikan no Yakuwari, 2 SHAKAI GIJUTSU KENKYUU RONBUNSHUU 275, 276 (Oct. 2004); Suzuki et al., Anzen 
Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 166-167.  JNES performed safety 
inspections and evaluations formerly entrusted to the Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation 
(Genshiryoku Hatsuden Gijutsu Kikou).  Id.  
361
  Mombukagakusho [MEXT], Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen ni Kansuru Soshiki Ni Tsuite, 
available at, http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuko/anzenkakuho/1260978.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 
2011). 
362
  Id.  
363
  Id. 
364
  Id. 
365
  Genshiryoku Iinkai Oyobi Genshiryoku Anzen Innkai Setchi Hō [Atomic Energy Commission and 
Nuclear Safety Commission Establishment Law] Law No. 188 of 1955, art. 1, Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu 
[Hōrei DB], available at, http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi.   
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nuclear energy.”366  In 1974, following a radiation leak on the nuclear vessel 
Mutsu, the Prime Minister’s Office, moved safety regulation from the JAEC 
to a newly established division in the Science and Technology Agency, and 
then, in 1978, to the newly established NSC.
367
   
As part of the 2001 administrative restructuring, the NSC became an 
independent office within the Cabinet Office.
368
  The purpose of the NSC 
was to provide a “double check”:  the NSC was tasked with third party 
oversight of all the other agencies regulating nuclear power, as well as 
oversight over the nuclear power industry itself.
369
  The NSC provided 
secondary evaluations of construction and operation applications for nuclear 
facilities and conducted secondary inspections.
370
  Separate sections within 
the commission investigated and established nuclear safety engineering 
standards; conducted “special investigations,” including investigating 
litigated claims; conducted nuclear safety inspections for commercial 
reactors, including planning and construction inspections; conducted 
“regular” inspections; and engaged in rule-making activities.371  The NSC 
could issue recommendations or warnings (kankoku) via the Prime 
Minister’s Office, and the Prime Minister was to “respect” the decisions of 
the NSC.
372
  
                                                     
366
Japan Atomic Energy Commission, The Mission, available at http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/i
ndex_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); Email correspondence with JAEC official (Jan. 10, 2013), on file 
with author.  Japanese law was silent with regard to nuclear security.  The JAEC, on its own initiative, 
established an advisory committee on nuclear security and published basic policies regarding the subject.  
Id.  The law is not silent with regard to its goal to develop nuclear energy.  The Japan Atomic Energy 
Agency Establishment Act specifies that part of the JAEC’s mission is to develop a Fast Breeder Reactor 
and nuclear fuel cycle.  Id.  
367
  Kokka Senryaku Shitsu, Genshiryoku Iinkai no Koremade no Katsudō to Keii (1950 Nendai - 
Genzai) at 6; summary of document available at, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/info/committee/kihonmond
ai/33th/33-3.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012); Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai 
teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 161, 165-166. 
368
  Id. 
369
  Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at 
II-5. 
370
  Id.  A former secretariat of the NSC suggests the NSC played four roles: 1) to act as a “double-
check” on the examinations conducted by the regulatory agency in issuing construction permits; 2) to 
establish basic safety inspection standards; 3) to “check” the regulatory activity of the government agencies 
regulating nuclear power generators; and 4) to respond to nuclear emergencies.  HIROSE, supra note 310, at  
10. 
371
  Suzuki et al., Anzen Kisei ni Okeru ‘Dokuritsusei’ to Shakai teki Shinrai, supra note 353, at 165-
166.  The NSC issued its first warning or recommendation in 2002, through the Prime Minister to METI 
relating to TEPCO.  Id.  at 166.  METI, in turn, issued warnings to TEPCO relating to problems with 
TEPCO’s inspections of its nuclear reactors.  See METI Natural Resources Division, Heisei 15 Nendo Jūyō 
Jikō, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2004/html/160g0020.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).  
372
  Id. 
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After March 11, criticism led to reform.
373
  Government officials 
announced plans for creation of a “highly independent” nuclear regulatory 
commission to replace NISA.
374
  The stated goal was to remove safety 
regulation from METI, the ministry in charge of promoting use of atomic 
energy, and to unify the major regulatory functions conducted by NISA and 
METI, the NSC, JAEC and MEXT into one regulatory body.
375
  After 
months of disagreement regarding the authority and structure of the new 
agency, on June 20, 2012, the Diet passed the Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
[NRA] Establishment Act.
376
  The new five-member commission is 
structured, as shown in Appendix A, to have “legally guaranteed 
independence,” with commission members appointed by the Diet.377  They 
will operate as an Article 3 Commission, affiliated with the Ministry of the 
Environment, and oversee approximately 500 regulators with limited ability 
to transfer to other agencies or industry.
378
  
The new regulatory commission began work September 2012, 
following continued disagreement in the Diet and recess appointments of the 
commissioners by the Prime Minister.
379
  The new regulatory structure is 
stream-lined compared to before, but it remains part of a complex structure 
that engages in detailed, primary ordering.  The basic regulatory framework 
for inspecting and licensing commercial nuclear reactors, for now, remains 
the same with the NRA assuming the roles played by NISA and the NSC.
380
   
                                                     
373
  Debate highlighted the regulators’ ineffective oversight and slow response to the Fukushima crisis.  
See, e.g., Human error amplified crisis: Amano, THE JAPAN TIMES, March 12, 2012; Kazuaki Nagata, 
Further restarts hinge on new watchdog, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 17, 2012. 
374
 IAEA to get report on plan for better regulatory system, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011; New 
Nuke safety bodies get OK, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 15, 2012. 
375
 “METI bureaucrats are reassigned every few years, mainly based on seniority, and often shuttle[d] 
between the nuclear promotion and regulation sections.”  Kazuaki Nagata, Nuke watchdog a ‘cosmetic 
change’, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012; Cabinet OKs new nuke watchdog, THE JAPAN TIMES Aug. 16, 
2011; Yuka Hayashi & Chester Dawson, supra note 353; Kazuaki Nagata, Further restarts hinge on new 
watchdog, supra note 376.  
376
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission Establishment Act, supra note 354. 
377
 Cabinet OKs new nuke watchdog, supra note 375; Kazuaki Nagata, supra note 373; Genshiryoku 
Kiseicho Hatsu Daichoukan ni Zen Keishi Soukan, NHK (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20120912/k10014964801000.html; Kazuaki Nagata, supra note 351.   
378
 Kazuaki Nagata, supra note 350; Cabinet Secretariat, Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai Secchi Houan no 
Gaiyou, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/info/seiritsu.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
379
  Kazuaki Nagata, Further restarts hinge on new watchdog, supra note 373; Seifu, Genshiryoku 
Kisei Iinkai wo 19 Nichi Hassoku, Iinchoura Shushoo Kengen de Ninmei, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (Sept. 
11, 2012), http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS11002_R10C12A9MM0000/.  Diet members were 
unable to reach agreement on who should be appointed to the new commission.  Id.    
380
  See Regulation Act, supra note 314 (Law No. 47 of June 27, 2012 Supplementary Provisions); 
Two of Japan’s nuclear safety bodies fade into the sunset, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012.  
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3. Licensing and Inspecting Nuclear Power Plants  
Regulation starts with oversight of inspections conducted by the 
nuclear power plant operators.
381
  NISA, pursuant to a grant of authority 
from METI, required each nuclear facility to develop and implement a 
maintenance (hozen) program
382
 and each operator to undertake “safety 
management inspections,” including pre-use safety management inspections, 
welding safety management inspections, and regularly scheduled safety 
management inspections.
383
  NISA and the NSC then conducted inspections 
of the inspections or inspected the facilities independently.
384
  The NRA now 
completes the inspections. 
Separate safety regulatory schemes exist for commercial, 
experimental, and research nuclear reactors.
385
  With commercial reactors, 
inspections are divided into four stages, with regulatory examinations or 
inspections occurring at the 1) planning and design stage; 2) construction 
stage; 3) operational stage; and 4) decommissioning.
386
  Violations of safety 
standards at any stage may result in administrative penalties, including 
prison sentences of up to a year and fines of up to ten million yen; 
suspension of an operating license for up to one year; or revocation of the 
license.
387
  
Pursuant to the Regulation Act, power plant operators must receive 
the approval of the METI Minister, now the NRA, to construct a new 
nuclear reactor.
388
  Power companies begin the process by picking a 
site,
389
which requires an environmental assessment prepared pursuant to the 
                                                     
381
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 14. 
382
  Id.   
383
  Id.  METI, pursuant to the Regulation Act, licensed establishment plans and construction methods, 
pre-use inspection, welding methods, safety measures, regular inspections, operating plans, safety 
compliance, and oversight inspections of operations management supervision. Pursuant to the Electricity 
Businesses Act, METI licensed construction plans, pre-use inspections, welding inspections, safety rules 
filings, regular inspections.  RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 1. 
384
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 15. 
385
  Id. at 33, 62, 71. 
386
  Id. at 31.  MEXT retained authority to regulate the safety of all experimental and research reactors.  
Their review process, with the exception of the planning stage is similar to that for commercial reactors.  
RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa (11-01-01-04), available at 
http://www.rist.or.jp/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi 
(Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa].  See also MEXT, Genshirō no Secchi, Unten, Nado, available at 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/genshiro_anzenkisei/1260755.htm. 
387
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 32; Regulation Act, supra note 314, at arts. 177-184. 
388
  Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 23(1).  Article 24 provides the standard for approval, and 
Article 26 filing and approval standards for changes.  Id.  See also Kantei [Cabinet Office], Jikomae no 
Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-2; HIROSE, supra note 310, 
at 34, 36. 
389
  Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 464.   
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Environmental Assessment Act and Energy Enterprises Act.
390
  With the 
application, the plant operator must submit basic construction plans, with 
regulators examining whether those plans meet the standards set out in the 
Regulation Act.
391
  Prior to September 2012, approval was based on a 
preliminary evaluation of the application by NISA, followed by a secondary 
evaluation and an opinion letter offered by the NSC.  NISA examined 
whether the submitted materials met licensing standards, including whether 
they presented any structural problems that would interfere with accident 
prevention.
 392
  NISA would also solicit the opinion of the JAEC regarding 
security measures; use consistent with Japan’s long-term plan for nuclear 
energy; and the financial health of the prospective licensee.
393
  The NSC 
opined on construction, technical ability to operate the plant, and disaster 
prevention measures, including ability to withstand an earthquake.
394
  The 
METI minister was required to "duly respect" the opinion of the NSC.
395
  
After September 2012, the NRA decides.
396
   
                                                     
390
  METI would solicit the opinion of the local governors during this process, make recommendations 
as necessary, and “take all available measures to protect the environment.”  They would hold public 
hearings in order to “obtain the understanding” of local citizens, and, following the hearings, meet with 
heads of related ministries then develop a Basic Energy Development Plan and designate the area as an 
Important Electricity Development District.  RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra 
note 356, at 2; RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa, supra note 386. 
391
  Regulation Act, supra note 314, art. 24.  RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni 
Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa (11-01-01-04), supra note 389. 
392
  RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa, supra note 386. 
393
 Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 24; email correspondence with JAEC official, supra note 
369.  Following the September 2011 regulatory reforms, responsibility for use consistent with long-term 
planning and ensuring the financial health of the licensee was transferred to the NRA.  Id.  
394
 See Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 23(2).  Review standards are set out in Article 24 of the 
Regulation Act and in METI Technical Standards Ordinance No. 62.  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 36.  
Secondary examinations by the NSC made use of advisory committees, such as the Nuclear Reactor Safety 
Specialist Committee, which focused on differences from earlier designs, new technical standards and 
research data, special attributes of the proposed location, and technical ability to safely operate the facility.  
Earthquake resistance standards are set out in the NSC’s Examination Guidelines for Earthquake 
Resistance Design for Electricity Producing Nuclear Reactor Facilities (Hatsudenyou Genshiro Shisetsu ni 
Kansuru Taishin Sekkei Shinsa Shishin) (Sept. 2006).  See Hirose, supra note 310, at 18.  See also Kantei, 
Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-2.  
Genshiryoku Anzen Iinkai, Hatsuden you Genshiryou Shisetsu ni Kansuru Taishin Sekkei Shinsa Shishin 
(2006), available at http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/shinsashishin/pdf/1/si004.pdf. 
395
  RIST, Genshiryoku Shisetsu no Secchi (Henkō) ni Kakawaru Anzen Shinsa, supra note 386.  The 
METI minister would also request an opinion letter from the AEC.  Id.  
396
  Regulation Act Article 24 continues to require the NRA solicit the opinion of the JAEC regarding 
peaceful use in processing a license application.  Email correspondence with JAEC official, supra note 369.  
With regard to any use at all, in 2012 Japan announced a new energy policy phasing out nuclear energy, 
and then backtracked.  One government official described “zero-nuclear status” as “an ambition, not a 
commitment.”  The METI Minister then committed to construction of new, previously approved reactors, 
and, more recently, the new Abe Cabinet has suggested that it will permit construction of new reactors.  
Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan’s New Leader Endorses Nuclear Plants, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at A8; Masami 
Ito, Abe Cabinet signals big changes ahead, THE JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 28, 2012; Mitsuru Obe, Japan to 
Reconsider Nuclear Phaseout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012; Takashi Mochizuki et al., Japan Seeks Slow 
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Following approval and prior to construction, the power company 
must, pursuant to the Electricity Act, have its construction plan approved, 
and file an Electricity Notice of Change.
397
  Design and construction plan 
specifics must comply with both Regulation Act standards and Electricity 
Act standards, including pre-approval of design plans relating to fuel.
398
   
During the construction process, the Electricity Act requires that the 
plant pass multiple “pre-use” inspections.399  They include on-site and off-
site pre-use safety inspections, regular inspections, regular safety 
inspections, and safety rules compliance inspections.
400
  The Electricity Act 
provides for separate inspections covering welding and fuel.
401
  It also 
requires “Pre-Use Safety Management Inspections” by the power company: 
internal inspections intended to determine compliance with construction 
plans and technical standards.
402
  Regulators evaluate the method, process, 
and results of these internal inspections.
403
  
The Regulation Act requires the operator to establish approved, 
internal safety rules prior to operation.
404
  The Regulation Act also requires 
                                                                                                                                                              
Nuclear Phase-Out, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2012; New reactor projects still on: Edano, THE JAPAN TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 2012.    
397
  Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at 
II-2; Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 330, at art. 9; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 34-35.  The Notice of 
Change Filing requirements are set out in the Electricity Businesses Act at Article 9.  Article 47(1) provides 
for the promulgation of technical standards.  Hatsudenyou Genshiryoku Setsubi ni Kansuru Gijutsu Kijun 
of Sadameru Shōrei [Ordinance Establishing Technical Standards Relating to the Establishment of 
Commercial Nuclear Reactors], MITI Ordinance No. 62 (June 15, 1965),  Hōrei teikyō de-ta shisutemu 
[Hōrei DB], http://law.e-gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi. 
398
  Id.; see also Electricity Businesses Act supra note 327, at art. 9, 47.  RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō 
no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 3.  Standards for licensing include a determination that 1) there 
is no risk the nuclear reactor will be used for anything other than peaceful purposes; 2) there is no risk that 
this license will threaten the planned development and use of nuclear energy; 3) there is a sufficient 
economic and technical base to construct the nuclear reactor and sufficient technical ability to operate it; 
and 4) there are no problems with accident prevention measures with the proposed reactor, reactor location, 
construction, facility, or fuel.  RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 2. 
399
  Electricity Businesses Act supra note 327, at art. 49(1) requires “Pre-use Inspections” by METI 
based on standards set out in METI ordinances.  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 36-42.  Kantei, Jikomae no 
Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-3. 
400
 RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 3. 
401
 Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at arts. 51-2.  Fuel inspections cover fuel design, 
processing, transportation, and handling.  Id. at 51(1)(3); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 38; Kantei, Jikomae no 
Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 310, at II-3. 
402
  Id.; Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 50-2. 
403
  HIROSE, supra note 310 at 38; Research Org. for Info., Sci. and Tech., Hatsudenyō Genshirō no 
Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 4.  Similar inspections for research reactors are made pursuant the 
Reactor Regulation Law; The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry evaluates the company’s process, 
methods, and schedules for conducting these inspections and inspection results, pursuant to Electricity Act 
Art. 50(2).  Research Org. for Info. Sci. and Tech., Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra 
note 356, at 3. 
404
  Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 37(1); Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 42.  
See also HIROSE, supra note 310, at 39-41.  Prior to September 2012, operators filed their internal 
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designation of a safety officer for the reactor, a “Primary Reactor 
Technician,” and filing of that designation. 405   The Regulation Act then 
requires creation and approval of internal Nuclear Materials Security 
Rules,
406
 notice filing of a “Nuclear Materials Security Management 
Officer,”407 as well as filing of a Notice of Use of Internationally Regulated 
Materials.
408
  
The Regulation Act requires submission of operating plans.
409
  Once 
started, the operator is then subject to regularly scheduled safety 
inspections.
410
  NISA, now the NRA, inspects the facility’s maintenance 
program; conducts regularly scheduled inspections; regularly scheduled 
inspections of the operator’s internal safety management program; and 
inspections based on the facility’s age.411  Regulatory inspections depend on 
the facility but are to be conducted not more than thirteen or eighteen 
months since the last regularly scheduled inspection.
412
  There are also fixed 
ten-year safety reviews, and additional evaluations of the facility prior to its 
operation beyond a thirty-year period.
413
   
The Regulation Act provides authority for on-site office and plant 
inspections, including document requests and record and equipment 
inspections; operator interviews and questioning of relevant persons; and 
confiscation for examination or testing of nuclear and other materials.
414
  
The Electricity Act also establishes a framework for “regularly scheduled 
inspections.”415  Enforcement regulations provide the details: they allow the 
government inspections to be conducted on-site by government regulators 
                                                                                                                                                              
regulations with METI for approval by the METI minister. Now their internal regulations are filed with and 
reviewed by the NRA.  The Commercial Power Generating Reactor Rules enumerate the subject matter for 
the internal rules, and include provisions governing facility operations and management, inspections, 
radiation management, security management, safety education, and quality management.  HIROSE, supra 
note 313, at 39. 
405
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 41. 
406
  Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 43-2(1). 
407
  Id. at art. 43(3); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 41. 
408
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 42. 
409
 Regulation Act, supra note 317, at art. 30; HIROSE, supra note 313, at 42. 
410
  Kantei, Jikomae no Waga Kuni no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei Nado no Shikumi, supra note 357 at, 
II-3. 
411
  Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 30; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 43. 
412
 HIROSE, supra note 310, at 48-49.  The time frame depends on designation by the METI minister.  
Id.  
413
  Id. at 15, 48.  The life cycle of nuclear reactors is the subject of debate, with consideration of a 
forty-year operational limit and exceptions to the limit.  See New nuke safety bodies get OK, THE JAPAN 
TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120615a2.html; NISA to let reactor run 
beyond 40 years, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120607a3.html.  
414
 Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 68; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 51; Research Org. for Info., 
Sci., and Tech., Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 5.  
415
  Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 54; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 47, 49-50. 
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accompanying operator employees during their regularly scheduled 
inspection(s) or by conducting a record review of the operator’s regularly 
scheduled inspections.
416
   
Apart from government inspections, the Electricity Act provides for 
“regularly scheduled safety management inspections” by the operator 
requiring inspection, recording, and preservation of items designated by 
ordinance.
417
  As with the pre-use inspections, the act provides for agency 
review of these internal inspections, covering both the process and 
methodology for the inspections, as well as the inspection results.
418
  
Separately an “Integrity Evaluation System” (kenzensei hyōka seido) 
requires the operators to confirm compliance with all current technical 
standards during both regularly scheduled inspections and operator 
inspections.
419
 
Apart from these inspections, the Regulation Act mandates “Safety 
Inspections” (hōan kensa) at least four times a year, which include review of 
operator compliance with both internal safety and security regulations.
420
  
Finally, the Regulation Act provides for Nuclear Materials Security 
Inspections, as well as a separate Security Measures Inspections by 
MEXT.
421
 
In short, primary ordering starts with the basic laws.  They organize 
the regulators and establish a detailed licensing and inspection program.  At 
each stage, black letter law provides a complex, detailed scheme for 
determining where and when a nuclear reactor operates. 
B.  Courts and Nuclear Energy 
Whether a nuclear power plant runs, however, depends not only on the 
regulators and these inspections but also on the judicial process.  Groups of 
individuals living near nuclear reactors have repeatedly filed administrative 
lawsuits seeking revocation of operating licenses, as well as civil lawsuits 
seeking injunctions against the operation of nuclear plants.
422
   
                                                     
416
  Electricity Businesses Act Enforcement Regulations art. 90(2); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 47. 
417
 Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 55; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 47, 49-50; RIST, 
Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 4. 
418
  Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327, at art. 55(4); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 50. 
419
  Electricity Businesses Act, supra note 327,  at arts. 39 and 55; HIROSE, supra note 310, at 46. 
420
  These inspections must also occur after designated events, which include when starting and 
stopping reactor, replacing fuel, or undertaking other specified operations involving cooling systems or 
reactor container water levels.  See Regulation Act, supra note 314, at art. 37(5); HIROSE, supra note 310, at 
50; RIST, Hatsudenyō Genshirō no Anzen Kisei no Gaiyō, supra note 356, at 5. 
421
  HIROSE, supra note 310, at 51. 
422
  Administrative litigation in Japan is a distinct subset of civil litigation, filed pursuant to the 
Administrative Case Litigation Act.  See, e.g., Narufumi Kadomatsu, Judicial Governance Through 
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In 1973, plaintiffs filed suit against the government seeking 
revocation of the establishment license for the Ikata Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 
Plaint in Shikoku.
423
  In 1975, about 400 plaintiffs brought a similar suit 
seeking to shut down the Fukushima Dai-Ni Nuclear Power Plant.
424
  In 
1992, after years of expert testimony and appeals, the Supreme Court ruled 
on both cases.
425
  The court affirmed both licensing decisions, affording 
broad technical discretion to the government in deciding whether to grant an 
operating license.
426
  
In the Ikata case, the Supreme Court held that there must be “mistakes 
or omissions that are difficult to overlook” (kanka shigatai kago, ketsuraku) 
in the investigation or decision-making process in order to find 
“irrationality” and, hence, illegality in licensing the reactor. 427   In the 
Fukushima case, the Supreme Court found it appropriate to limit inquiry to 
issues relating to the safety of the basic design, and not review all of the 
safety inspections required under the Regulation Act.
428
  Within these 
constraints, the Supreme Court found no “irrationality” in these cases, but it 
did shift the burden of proof.
429
  It held that while the plaintiffs in principle 
bear the burden of proof, given that the defendant agencies have all of the 
relevant records, if the defendant fails to claim and prove rationality, the 
court would adopt a factual inference that there was irrationality in the 
agency’s decision.430  The court afforded the government deference, after 
review and shifting the burden of proof.
431
 
The same year, the Supreme Court recognized standing for citizens 
seeking to invalidate the operating license for the Monju Fast Breeder 
                                                                                                                                                              
Resolution of Legal Disputes?–A Japanese Perspective, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. R. 141, 145-152 (2009).  
See also Professor Levin’s discussion of litigation under the act. Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities 
and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection of Japan’s Indigenous Ainu People to Inform 
Understandings of the United States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419 (2001).  
423
 UTATSU, supra note 332, at 75; Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 Sho (gyō tsu) no. 133, 
804 HANREI TAIMUZU 51 (Ikata). 
424
  UTATSU, supra note 332, at 74; Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992, Hei 2 (gyō tsu) no. 
147, 804 HANREI TAIMUZU 65 (Fukushima); See also Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear 
Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 468. 
425
  UTATSU, supra note 332, at 74-76.   
426
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Ikata case), supra note 423; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
Apr. 10, 1992, (Fukushimia case), supra note 429. 
427
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Ikata case), supra note 423, at 61. 
428
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Fukushima case), supra note 424, at 68. 
429
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1992 (Ikata case), supra note 423, at 61.   
430
Id.  Japanese courts shifted the burden of proof in the Minamata and other pollution cases in the 
1970s.  UPHAM, supra note 28, at 43-44.  The do so now routinely in other áreas of the law.   Yuka Kaneko, 
A Procedural Approach to Judicial Reform in Asia, 23 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 313, 336 (2010); Ramseyer, 
The Effect of Universal Health Insurance on Malpractice Claims, supra note 24, at 675 & no. 52.   
431
 UTATSU, supra note 332, at 75-76.  
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Reactor in Fukui.
432
  After remand, a cooling system malfunctioned resulting 
in a fire at the reactor and the government shutting it down.
433
  The district 
court still found the plant safe; the Nagoya High Court did not.
434 
 The high 
court found that a high degree of care was required in safety examinations of 
this next-generation commercial reactor, that the national government had 
the burden of proving safety, and that both substantively and procedurally 
the government’s safety inspections fell below the required level of care.  
The court found the safety inspections of the reactor facility needed “to be 
redone in their entirety” and voided the license.435  In 2005, the Supreme 
Court overturned the injunction finding no “mistakes or omissions that are 
difficult to overlook” and no “illegality” in the licensing process.436  
Civil suits have fared no better.  In 1999, a Sapporo District Court 
decision reviewed plaintiffs’ demand for an injunction against the operation 
of Hokkaido Tomari Nuclear Reactors Nos. 1 & 2.
437
  The court rejected 
plaintiffs’ claims, but it did recognize an “abstract risk of danger is always 
present that nuclear power generation invites a result that cannot be 
reversed.”438  In a suit seeking to enjoin operation of the Shiga Nuclear 
Power Plant No. 2, residents living around the plant argued that they were 
subjected to a risk of radiation exposure beyond permissible levels, and the 
Kanazawa District Court agreed: “in operating the nuclear reactors . . . the 
plaintiffs are exposed to a concrete risk of injury to life, body, and health.”439  
The court imposed on the national government and power company a burden 
of proof of safety, and found, in this case, that the safety inspection 
                                                     
432
  Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 22, 1992, Hei gan (gyō-tsu) no. 130, 801 HANREI TAIMZU 83, 
91; UTATSU, supra note 335, at 75.  Litigation started when local residents sued MITI to void the permit it 
issued in 1983 to build the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor.  The Fukui District Court dismissed their claim for 
lack of standing; the Nagoya High Court granted standing to those nearest the plant; the Supreme Court 
expanded standing and remanded in 1992.  Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on 
Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 470.  
433
  Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 470. 
434
 Fukui Chisai [Fukui Dist. Ct.] Mar. 22, 2000, Hei 4 (gyō u) no. 6, 1043 HANREI TAIMUZU 122, 258 
(Japan); reversed Nagoya Kōsai Kanazawa Shibu [Nagoya High Ct. Kanazawa Branch] Jan. 27, 2003, Hei 
12 (gyō ko) no. 12, 1117 Hanrei Taimuzu 83, 210.  
435
  Nagoya High Ct. Kanazawa Branch, Jan. 27, 2003, supra note 439, at 210.   
436
  Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 30, 2005, Hei 15 (gyō-hi) no. 108, 1191 HANREI TAIMUZU 175, 
179.  Other suits seeking injunctions have reached a similar result.  A Fukushima court dismissed a suit 
seeking an injunction against use of plutonium enriched MOX at the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor, and 
courts have found standing but dismissed on the merits cases involving reactors in Onagawa, Ehime, Tokai-
mura, Takahama, Tomari, and Kashiwazaki.  See Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear 
Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 469-470.  
437
 Sapporo Chisai [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 22, 1999, Sho 63 (wa) no. 2041, 1676 HANREI JIHŌ 3.  
438
  Id.  Plaintiffs failed in a similar suit seeking to enjoin Hokuriku Shiga Nuclear Power Plant No. 1.  
See Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 469. 
439
  Kanazawa Chisai [Kanazawa Dist. Ct.] Mar. 24, 2006, Hei 11 (wa) no. 430, 1277 HANREI 
TAIMUZU 317, 372.  
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standards were inadequate.
440
  That court issued an injunction against 
operation of the plant that was, again, short-lived.  In March 2009, the 
Nagoya High Court overturned the decision finding insufficient evidence of 
a risk to the plaintiffs’ health and safety.441  The Supreme Court declined to 
hear the appeal and affirmed the high court in October 2010.
442
   
Plaintiffs groups have also sued to block the sale of land for use as a 
reactor, without success.
443
  They have purchased stock in the power 
companies and filed derivative suits opposing reactor operations, without 
success.
444
  Plaintiffs have filed suits for money damages, without success.
445
  
Following the Tokaimura accident, courts even found plaintiffs who did sue 
had received larger provisional payments than warranted and ordered them 
to repay JCO the excess.
446
     
 To date, private causes of action seeking revocation of operating 
licenses in administrative suits and seeking injunctions prohibiting operation 
in civil suits have all failed.  But local residents continue to sue: local 
residents have recently filed suit against the Japan Atomic Power Company 
seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the restart of two reactors in its 
Tsuruga nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture;
447
 local residents have 
again filed suit against Hokuriku Electric Power Company seeking to shut-
down the two nuclear reactors at Shika.
448
  There are numerous Fukushima-
related suits, both civil and criminal, now pending.
449
  
                                                     
440
 Id. at 326-27. 
441
 Nagoya Kousai [Nagoya High Ct.] Mar. 18, 2009, Hei 18 (ne) no. 108, 1307 HANREI TAIMUZU 
187, 282. 
442
  In October 29, 2010, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal.  See UTATSU, supra note 332, at 78. 
443
  Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 471 
-72. 
444
  Id.  Following a cooling system malfunction, in 1989 local citizens contested operation of the 
Fukushima Dai Ni reactors, through a shareholders suit.  A Tokyo district and high court, deferred to 
specialists who opined it safe to restart the reactor, and rejected the suit.  Id. at 469.   
445
  Id. at 472-75; UTATSU, supra note 332, at 81-92.     
446
  Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 475.  
Thousands did receive compensation following the Tokai-mura incident.  They did so through 
administrative procedures established by the power companies, pursuant to guidelines established by the 
Science and Technology Agency’s Atomic Energy Damage Investigation Committee.  UTATSU, supra note 
335, at 81-92.   
447
Residents sue over Tsuruga reactors, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp
/news/2011/11/09/national/residents-sue-over-tsuruga-reactors/#.UTlkaBx_CSo. 
448
  Residents sue to scrap Shika nuke reactors, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 27, 2012), 
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120627a8.html.  In 2006 the Kanazawa District Court enjoined 
operation of the No. 2 reactor at Shika, a decision overturned by the Nagoya High Court in 2009 and 
Supreme Court in 2010.  Id.  
449
  Fukushima-related suits include a criminal complaint filed by 1,300 people alleging criminal 
negligence on the part of both TEPCO and government regulators and four civil “class-action” lawsuits 
aggregating the claims of approximately 1650 plaintiffs, as, as well as individual actions.  U.S. service 
members participating in Operation Tomodachi have also filed suit in U.S. court claiming damages for 
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 Even if a power company prevails in litigation, however, that still 
does not mean its nuclear power plant will operate.  It can meet all the 
regulatory requirements, pass all the inspections, and win in court, but 
another layer of norms still apply. 
C.  “Gentlemen’s Agreements” 
Authority for regulating the safety of the nuclear industry resides in 
the central government; with the exception of periods during designated 
nuclear disasters, no legal authority to regulate is provided to local 
governments.
450
  But whether or not a nuclear power plant runs depends on a 
“gentlemen’s agreement” (shinshi kyōtei) between the power company and 
local governments.
451
 
These gentlemen’s agreements exist outside of any regulatory 
framework and without any legal basis.
452
  Prior to March 11, they were the 
subject of criticism, with commentators lamenting that local governments 
have, without a legal basis, “wielded a de facto right of refusal” to permit 
plants built in their prefectures to operate.
453
  Others have complained that 
this de facto requirement has become “a barrier to effective business 
operations.”454    
The agreements started with TEPCO’s agreement with the Fukushima 
Prefectural government in 1969.
455
  Similar agreements with other 
prefectures, including Fukui, Shizuoka, and Ibaragi Prefectures, followed.
456
  
The written basis for the “gentlemen’s agreement” is an agreement signed by 
                                                                                                                                                              
exposure resulting from TEPCO lying about the radiation risk.  See 1,300 file complaints against TEPCO, 
THE JAPAN TIMES (June 12, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/12/national/1300-file-
complaints-against-tepco/#.UTlnhhx_CSo; Family of nuke crisis suicide victim to sue TEPCO for damages, 
THE JAPAN TIMES (May 10, 2012) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/10/national/family-of-nuke-
crisis-suicide-victim-to-sue-tepco-for-damages/#.UTlmnRx_CSo; Chico Harlan, Nuclear redress will never 
approximate losses, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/27/nati
onal/nuclear-redress-will-never-approximate-losses/#.UTllqRx_CSo; Government, Tepco sued over fallout, 
THE JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/12/national/government-
tepco-sued-over-fallout/#.UXL7qbWG3pU; Eight U.S. sailors sue Tepco for millions for falsely 
downplaying Fukushima radiation exposure, THE JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121228a3.html. 
450
  Shin-etsu Sugawara, et al., Genshiryoku Anzen Kyōtei wo Meguru Hito Kōsatsu [A Study on the 
Nuclear Safety Agreements Compared with the Pollution Control Agreements], 10 NIHON GENSHIRYOKU 
GAKKAI WABUN RONBUNSHU 119 (2011). 
451
  Genpatsu no Saikidou tte Dō Iu Koto?, ASAHI SHINBUN (July 5, 2011), at 2. 
452
  Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 119.  Local governments have been criticized, as a result, for 
“excessive involvement” leading to opaqueness in the regulatory process.  Id.   
453
  Id. at 119, 121.   
454
  Id.  Where praised, they have been characterized as augmenting deficiencies in governmental 
regulation.  Id.   
455
  Id. 
456
  Id. 
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the power company with the local prefecture and city government where the 
plant is to be located.
457
   
A 2005 agreement entered into by the Fukui Prefectural Government, 
local governments, and the companies operating the five nuclear power 
plants in Fukui provides one example.
458
  It is full of “must endeavor to” 
language.
459
 It states that the agreement’s purpose is to “preserve the safety 
of the surrounding environment and the workers at the power generation 
plant.”460  In order to accomplish this, Article 1 sets out that the power 
company and local governments are to “function as one.”461  The power 
company “in order to preserve the safety of the surrounding environment 
and the power plant workers, must take every measure possible.”462   
This includes observing all related laws and performing “in good 
faith” the obligations of the agreement.463  According to the agreement, the 
power company must, among other things, pro-actively develop quality 
control measures and strengthen risk management systems; develop new 
technologies and improve existing systems; thoroughly educate, train, and 
supervise both employees and contractors working at the facility; develop 
comprehensive nuclear accident plans and protective measures against 
nuclear emergencies; and develop environmental protection measures.
464
  
Other terms are more concrete.  The power company must obtain the 
agreement of the local governments prior to the construction of new 
facilities and prior to significantly altering existing plans.
465
  It must contact 
local governments in advance of new fuel or spent fuel shipments.
466
  It must 
communicate information regarding construction, operating conditions, 
environmental radiation measurements, and reactor surveys.
467
  The power 
company must immediately contact the local government in the event of an 
emergency; operation of emergency cooling measures; leakage of 
radioactive substances; unplanned stoppages and malfunctions; radiation 
                                                     
457
  Fukui Agreement (May 16, 2005) on file with author. 
458
 Id.; Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 119, 124.  
459
  “The direction to ‘endeavor’ or make best efforts…is not uncommon in Japanese legislation 
“where a gentle touch is desired.”  Mark A. Levin, Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on 
Instrumental and Judicial Administration in Japan, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 265, 303 n. 164 (2011). 
460
 Fukui Agreement Preamble, supra note 462.   
461
  Id. art. 1.   
462
  Id. art. 2.   
463
  Id. art. 2(2). 
464
  Id. arts. 2(3) & 4.  Other “musts” include strengthening measures relating to aging facilities; 
sharing information with sub-contractors and product manufacturers; developing measures to ensure the 
safety of the workers, reduction of radiation exposure, and reduction of radioactive waste. 
465
  Id. at art. 3.  See also Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 125. 
466
  Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, at art. 5. 
467
  Id. art. 6. 
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poisoning of workers beyond established standards; other injury; or other 
similar events.
468
  Local governments retain the right to demand reports from 
the power company and conduct on-site inspections of the facility.
469
  
Representatives of the local community may accompany central government 
regulators on inspections if there is a risk to the health of local residents.
470
 
The agreement provides that local governments may demand 
stoppage, limited use, or improvements to the reactors where, based on 
previous reports or an on-site inspection, additional safety measures are 
determined necessary; special measures are necessary to prevent the release 
of radiation following an accident or emergency; or special measures are 
determined necessary following review of accidents at other nuclear power 
generating facilities.
471
  The agreement also provides for an “agreement 
regarding resumption of operations” 472  if operations at a reactor are 
terminated pursuant to one of the above conditions, or if operations are 
terminated following an accident resulting in the formation of a special 
investigation committee by the national government.
473
     
The requirement of local government approval for operation has been 
interpreted broadly.
474
  While the agreements concluded with local 
governments require only that the power company report to the local 
government regarding regularly scheduled inspections, the power companies 
in practice explain the results of inspections and seek the approval of the 
local governments prior to restarting a reactor.
475
 There is no legal 
requirement to do so, but there is the reality that future approval for 
additional construction or substantial changes in operations, which are 
covered by the agreement, would be difficult to obtain absent cooperation at 
other times.
476
      
                                                     
468
  Id. art. 7. 
469
  Id. art. 8.  See also Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 125.  The Fukui Prefectural Government 
conducted one such onsite inspection following an incident in August 2004 at Bihama Nuclear Power 
Station.  Sugawara, et al., supra note 450, at 125.   
470
  Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, art. 9.  See also Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 125. 
471
  Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, at art. 10. 
472
  Id. art. 11. 
473
  Id.   
474
  Teiki Kensa ga Owattemo Jimoto no Rikai ga Fukaketsu Da Yo, ASAHI SHINBUN (July 5, 2011) at 
2. 
475
  Id.  This right of refusal has also been applied by analogy to incidents resulting in an unscheduled 
shutdown of a reactor.  Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 119, 126.   
476
 Teiki Kensa ga Owattemo Jimoto no Rikai ga Fukaketsu Da Yo, supra note 474, at 2.  The power 
company goes on to agree to compensate local residents “in good faith” and immediately undertake 
measures to prevent further damage if damage has been caused as a result of operation of the power plant.  
Fukui Agreement, supra note 457, at art. 12.  The power company agrees to engage in thorough education 
and training as well as develop clear and speedy communication networks as part of strengthening its 
nuclear accident response measures.  Id. at art. 13.  The company must inform the local governments of any 
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Even before March 11, commentators noted an increase in local 
government intervention.
477
  The agreements have frequently resulted in 
separate examinations by prefectural governments apart from the statutory 
inspection process, with approval decisions based on undisclosed criteria 
made by the local heads of government, at times long after completion of the 
central government’s regulatory inspections.478   
The result has been a variety of standards applied by local 
governments to reactor construction and re-starts.
479
  In May 2010, prior to 
the restart of the Monju Fast Breeder reactor, local governments demanded 
not only additional safety measures but also additional regional 
“revitalization efforts” by the central government as a condition for 
restarting the reactor.
480
  Some argue local governments have held nuclear 
plants hostage in exchange for more economic aid.  Others suggest that the 
local governments seek to incorporate “societal considerations” into the 
approval process.
481
  
Regardless of the motives, local governments have the final say.
482
  
But even that statement is shroud in ambiguity.  As Japan debated the re-start 
of its nuclear reactors following March 11, national officials affirmed that 
“local consent” is necessary, but there was no consensus about what 
constituted local—whether local consent is limited to the town and 
                                                                                                                                                              
special press conferences or releases regarding the power plant. Id. at art. 14.  The company agrees to 
respond in writing and on local government forms to information requested.  Id. at arts. 3, 5, and 6.  Both 
parties are to designate a contact person to facilitate communications.  Id. at arts. 15 & 16. The parties also 
agree that either party may propose revisions to the agreement if the need arises; both parties agree to 
“negotiate in good faith regarding revisions to the agreement”; to negotiate and set out any additional 
necessary details in a separate memorandum; to negotiate regarding concerns arising relating to provisions 
in the agreement or matters not addressed therein.  Id. at arts. 17-19.. 
477
  Sugawara et al., supra note 450, at 119, 129. 
478
 Id. at 124-25. 
479
  Id. at 126. 
480
  Id. 126. 
481
  Id. at 124. 
482
Mayor OKs Genkai Plant Reactor Restart, THE JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.japantime
s.co.jp/news/2011/11/02/national/mayor-oks-genkai-plant-reactor-restart/#.UWXjZhmHzoc.  The mayor of 
the town “effectively approved Kyushu Electric Power Co.’s plan to restart a nuclear reactor halted due to 
human error.”  Id. Communities throughout Japan have refused to allow reactors to restart following 
routine maintenance.  Yuka Hayashi et al., Japan Premier Pushes Nuclear-Plant Restarts, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904194604576582240847767666.html. 
“Under Japanese law, local governments have no power to dictate the operation of nuclear power plants.  
But all of Japan’s nine regional utilities that own and operate nuclear plants have safety agreements with 
hosting municipal and prefectural governments in which those authorities are given some say in plant 
operations.”  Mari Iwata & Eleanor Warnock, Tokyo Clears 2 Reactors for Restart, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303624004577341591983335470.html. 
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prefecture in which the reactor is located, or extends to surrounding towns 
and prefectures that might be affected by the plant’s operation.483     
In seeking to restart the Oi reactors in Fukui Prefecture following 
March 11, the central government first assumed the former, but, in the face 
of opposition from surrounding towns and prefectures, it attempted to 
persuade officials from the surrounding areas.
484
  The METI Minister opined 
that local consent should not be decided “mechanically and numerically” but 
“comprehensively” and “based on political judgments and 
responsibilities.”485  
The search for “local consent” split local residents in Oi.  Critics of 
nuclear power pointed to continued safety concerns and supporters pointed 
to employment and related tax revenue that provided up to sixty percent of 
the town’s budget. 486   In the end, economics won out. 487   The central 
government approved the re-start of the Oi reactors, and requested local 
consent.
 488
  The Oi municipal assembly reviewed, at the mayor’s request, 
whether to restart the reactors and endorsed doing so.
489
  They were followed 
by the seven-prefecture and two-city Union of Kansai Governments, which 
ultimately deferred to the central government.
490
  The local nuclear reactor 
                                                     
483
 Fukutaro Yamashita, Meaning of ‘local’ authority unclear, THE DAILY YOMIURI, March 15, 2012, 
at 3.   
484 Noda’s reactor restart scenario thwarted, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 8, 2012, http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2012/05/08/national/nodas-reactor-restart-scenario-thwarted/#.UWZH_RmHzoc.  Some 
commentators suggested that regulations governing evacuation areas should be used as a guidepost to 
determine local consent, but recent changes expanding evacuation areas from ten kilometers to thirty 
kilometers significantly increased the number of local governments from which consent would be required.  
Confusion over ‘local entities’, THE DAILY YOMIURI, March 25, 2012, at 2. 
485
  Yamashita, Meaning of ‘local’ authority unclear, supra note 488, at 3; Confusion over ‘local 
entities’, supra note 483, at 2. 
486
 Akiyoshi Hatamoto & Noriko Hara, Local Communities Await Decision on Reactors, THE DAILY 
YOMIURI, March 15, 2012, at 3.  Martin Fackler, Japan’s Premier Seeks Support for Using Nuclear Power, 
N. Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/asia/japans-prime-minister-seeks-
public-support-for-nuclear-energy.html?_r=0.  “Reactors bring massive subsidies, jobs, and tax revenue.”  
Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines, supra note 309, at 464.  A 2004 
METI pamphlet promises over ¥39 billion in subsidies during the ten years from the initial environmental 
impact statement to operation and over ¥50 billion in subsidies and revenue during the first ten years of 
operation.  Id. at 465.   
487
 Eric Johnston, Official Kansai’s Reactor Nod Puzzles, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 7, 2012, 
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120607a5.html; Fackler, supra note 486.   
488
 Oi Assembly Says Yes to Restarting Reactors, THE JAPAN TIMES (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/15/national/oi-assembly-says-yes-to-restarting-
reactors/#.UWeX4RlAutR; Pushing Back, Fukui Governor Calls for Clear Nuclear Policy, THE JAPAN 
TIMES, May 16, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/16/national/pushing-back-fukui-
governor-calls-for-clear-nuclear-policy/#.UWe6lBlAutQ. 
489
  Oi assembly says yes to restarting reactors, supra note 488. 
490
  Kansai governor; Oi reactors restart is state’s call, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 31, 2012, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/31/national/kansai-governors-oi-reactors-restart-is-states-
call/#.UWeY9xlAutQ,); Fukui governor asks why Oi reactors should be restarted, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 
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safety commission affiliated with the Fukui Prefectural government then 
approved the restart.
491
  The governor of Fukui prefecture then gave his 
approval, and transmitted it to the central government along with a request 
for greater safety measures, training, and research.
492
  Final approval by the 
central government followed.
493
  In short, regardless of all the law defining 
when a reactor can operate, the central government sought and obtained the 
consent of local governments, broadly defined, before restarting the 
reactors.
494
 
D.  Law and Nuclear Energy Conclusion  
There is an elaborate regulatory structure governing operation of 
nuclear power plants in Japan—law and regulation everywhere you look.  
But when it comes time to flip the switch, that law and the process it dictates 
takes a backseat to a “gentlemen’s agreement.”  The result is local 
government applying an undefined standard of review and consensus 
determining whether or not a nuclear reactor should operate.   
March 11 and its aftermath demonstrate that both layers of the law, 
formal and informal, failed.  The point here is to understand that there are 
multiple layers of norms governing the process.  Concrete rights and 
obligations have not replaced Professor Kawashima’s rights that “exist but 
don’t exist.”495  Detailed norms now operate in conjunction with gentlemen’s 
agreements and “rights that exist but don’t exist.”      
This layering of formal and informal norms is echoed in TEPCO’s 
post-March 11 application for assistance from the government.  On May 10, 
2011, pursuant to Article 16 of the Compensation Act, TEPCO submitted to 
                                                                                                                                                              
5, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/05/national/fukui-governor-asks-why-oi-reactors-
should-be-restarted/#.UWeZIhlAutQ. 
491
  Official Kansai’s Reactor Nod Puzzles, supra note 489; Local nuclear safety commission says Oi 
reactors safe to restart, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 11, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/06/11/n
ational/local-nuclear-safety-commission-says-oi-reactors-safe-to-restart/#.UWeZ2hlAutQ. 
492
  Kazuaki Nagata, Reactors at Oi to be reactivated, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 17, 2012, 
http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120617a1.html,; Mitsuru Obe & Chester Dawson, Nuclear-Plant 
Restart Highlights Split in Japan, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB300014240
52702303444204577460272545747302.html.  
493
  Nagata, Reactors at Oi to be reactivated, supra note 492; Nuclear-Plant Restart Highlights Split 
in Japan, supra note 494.   
494
  Industry officials had urged the central government to move quickly, impliedly regardless of local 
consent:  “The final decision is up the government, or the prime minister . . . I would like to ask the prime 
minister to make a bold decision quickly.”  Edano Not for Restarting Oi Reactors Temporarily, THE JAPAN 
TIMES, May 30, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/30/national/edano-not-for-restarting-oi-
reactors-temporarily/#.UWe68RlAutQ.  Decisions without obtaining consent remain a possibility when 
informal norms apply.   
495
  See KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI  supra note 1, at 93, 104, 116, 139, 151. 
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the Japanese government a request for assistance.
496
  The request (onegai) 
starts off with an apology and acceptance of responsibility:   
 
As a result of the accident at this company’s Fukushima Dai-
ichi Nuclear Power Plant, for those living near the plant and for 
society at large, the company has caused great concern and 
inconvenience for which it sincerely apologizes.  The company, 
at this point, sincerely accepts the fact that it is the cause of 
nuclear energy damage, and, from the perspective of realizing 
prompt compensation to all those who suffered injury, will 
provide compensation based on the Compensation Act….497   
 
The request ends with a plea:  “by all means, we humbly request 
Japanese government assistance.”498   
Note the language of entreaty, apology, and acceptance of 
responsibility.  It is not the language of contract or of rights and obligations.  
It is not language made with an eye towards litigation.  It is the type of 
language found in Professor Kawashima’s discussion of superior and inferior 
relationships.
499
  It is the type of language found in Tokugawa pleadings, 
where government action was a benevolent grant not a right.
500
  The 
Compensation Act provides a formal legal structure to apply for government 
assistance, but TEPCO’s application takes the form of an apology and a plea.   
It is difficult to imagine a company facing similar liability in the U.S. 
leading with an apology and lodging a humble plea for assistance with the 
government.
501
  It is easy to imagine that happening in Professor 
                                                     
496
 Compensation Act, supra note 331, art. 16.  The act states that “the government will provide 
necessary assistance to the nuclear energy enterprise for that enterprise to pay compensation for damages 
when damages have arisen from nuclear energy exceeding the liability for the nuclear energy enterprise to 
provide compensation as set out in Article 3, and it is determined necessary to meet the aims of this Act.”  
Id.   
497
 TEPCO, Genshiryoku Songai Baisho ni Kakawaru Kuni no Shien no Onegai (May 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/songaibaisho_110511.pdf.  See also UTATSU, 
supra note 332, at 36.  
498
  Id.   
499
 KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌSHIKI, supra note 1, at 103. 
500
  See, e.g., Dan Fenno Henderson, Nuinosuke v. Chūbē: Conciliation in Tokugawa Civil Trials, 
reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES & COMMENTARY 1,13 (Milhaut et al., eds., 
2012); John O. Haley, Rivers and Rice: What Lawyers and Legal Historians Should Know About Medieval 
Japan, 36 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 310, 347 (2010); Dan Fenno Henderson, Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law, 
27 WASH. L. REV. 83, 92-93, 100-102 (1952).  
501
  It is difficult to imagine a company operating in the U.S. repeating that apology after being named 
as a defendant by thousands of injured plaintiffs.  Tepco recently did just that.  In a news conference it 
stated “our safety, culture, skills, and ability were all insufficient….  We must humbly accept our failure to 
prevent the accident, which we should have avoided by using our wisdom and resources to be better 
prepared.” Mari Yamaguchi, Utility company shoulders blame for Japan nuclear crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, 
666 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 3 
 
Kawashima’s Japan.502  Whether operation or compensation, regulation of 
the nuclear power industry in Japan occurs on two levels: it starts with a 
complex formal regulatory and compensatory scheme, and ends with 
relationships and rights that “exist but don’t exist.”   
V. CONCLUSION 
This article discusses three areas of the law and from that discussion 
makes a broader argument about how law functions in Japan today.  One 
could ask if these areas are representative.    
One could also look elsewhere.  In commercial law, Japan now 
provides thirty-nine different corporate forms to choose from.
503
  In contrast 
to that complexity stands the Supreme Court’s 2010 enunciation of its 
business judgment rule, which provides for review of process and substance:  
“so long as there are no conspicuously unreasonable points in the decision-
making process and substance, the board of directors will not be found to 
have breached their duty of care.”504   
One could look to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s 2011 
ordinance targeting those who willingly or unwittingly do business with 
organized crime.
505
  Businesses now have a “duty to endeavor” (dōryoku 
gimu) to include in all contracts language permitting termination, without 
notice, if it is discovered that the other party is in some way affiliated with 
organized crime.
506
  Discovery of affiliation between any employee and a 
member of organized crime now, at least in theory, provides grounds for 
immediate termination of contracts for everything from leases to the supply 
of vending machines.
507
  Landlords are refusing to rent apartments to and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/03/30/utility-company-shoulders-blame-
for-japan-nuclear-crisis/3Pr80cDmbqI5KXhmqAL2wN/story.html. 
502
  See KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌSHIKI, supra notes 2-21.  
503
 JAPAN CORPORATION LAW GUIDE 54-56 (2009).  
504
 Saikōsai Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2010, Hei 21 (uke) no. 183, at 4, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ], http://www.courts.go.jp. 
505
  Tokyo Bōryokudan Haijo Jōrei [Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance on the Elimination of Organized 
Crime], Ordinance of March 18, 2011, arts. 12-14, http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/sotai/ 
haijo_seitei.htm.  See also Keishichō, Jōrei no Gaiyō, http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/sotai/haijo_seit
ei.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 20120).; Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jeff Bater, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Japan 
Organized Crime, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020391830
4577241844134189560.html; Mark Schreiber, Anti-yakuza Laws Are Taking Their Toll, THE JAPAN TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/03/04/national/anti-yakuza-laws-are-taking-their-
toll/#.UWemfxlAutQ. 
506
  Jōrei no Gaiyō, supra note 505; Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance on the Elimination of Organized 
Crime, supra note 511, art. 18.    
507
 E.g., Sept. 14, 2011 and Dec. 26, 2011 contracts on file with author.  One of Japan’s most 
successful talk show hosts was forced to resign from his management company following revelations of 
past ties to a member of organized crime.  See Wakabayashi & Bater, supra note 505.    
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banks refusing to open bank accounts for those suspected of ties to 
organized crime.
508
  Some driving schools now require their students’ pledge 
“absolutely no ties to organized crime” before the school will certify their 
attendance allowing them to apply for a driver’s license.509  The aim of the 
ordinance is understandable; the means employed shows a willingness to 
expand the law and contract’s reach into every corner of society.   
In contrast stands the increasing use of prosecutorial discretion not to 
prosecute.
510
  Prosecution rates for general crimes declined from 
approximately 45% in 2000 to 36.2% in 2010; prosecution rates for special 
crimes declined during the same period from over 70% to 56.3%.
511
  
Criminal law now dictates the terms of routine contracts, but, at the same 
time, the exercise of discretion within the criminal justice system has grown. 
Rather than reviewing additional areas of the law, however, the 
evidence warrants stepping back, and returning to Professor Kawashima’s 
discussion of the role of law in Japan.  Professor Kawashima described law 
in Japan as like an heirloom sword, something to be displayed and admired 
but not used.
512
  Japanese law scholars have debated the validity of the 
analogy since.
513
  The discussion here suggests that a different debate is 
necessary.   
The law now fences off, in increasingly small parcels, much of the 
landscape of Japanese society.  Legal norms, including private ordering and 
public laws, are readily visible and commonly invoked.  While these fences 
define the territory and provide the starting point in resolving disputes, if 
challenged they often give way.  They give way to secondary ordering that 
occurs in the undefined spaces of equity.  As a result, negotiation in Japan 
often occurs not in the shadow of the law, but in the shadow of primary 
attempts at ordering, and when negotiation fails, then based on notions of 
fairness and consensus. 
                                                     
508
  Schreiber, supra note 505. 
509
 Id. 
510 Saikō Saibanshō, Keiji Tetsuzuki, http://www.courts.go.jp/saiban/syurui_keizi/keizi_01_02/index.ht
ml (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).  Prosecutors may decide not to prosecute if there is insufficient evidence that 
the suspect committed the crime or if there is sufficient evidence but, in light of considerations including 
the suspect’s character, age and circumstances; the severity of the crime and any extenuating 
circumstances; and the circumstances following commission of the crime, the prosecutor decides that it is 
“not necessary” to prosecutor.  Id.  See also, Midori Daisuke, Kensatsukan no Sotsui Sairyō to Sono Genkai, 
676 HŌGAKU SEMINA 141 (Apr. 2011); Masaki Yamamoto, Kensatsukan Seido to Kiso Sairyōken, in 
NIHON KEIJIHŌ NO RIRON TO TENBŌ 85 (2002).  
511
Keisatsusho, Heisei 22 Nendo Hannzai Hakusho, http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/57/nfm/n_57_2_2_2
_3_0.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Keisatsusho, Heisei 23 Nendo Hannzai Hakusho, 
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/58/nfm/images/full/h2-2-3-02.jpg (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
512
  KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌSHIKI, supra note 1, at 47. 
513
  See supra notes 19 to 31. 
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A Japanese lease will detail liability for damaged shower hoses and 
rubber stoppers, but, if challenged, a Japanese court will void a contractually 
mandated rent increase when it doesn’t reflect current economic 
circumstances.  Employers routinely impose broad liability on their 
employees and invoke detailed work rules that conflict with decades of 
judicial decisions, but, if an employee pushes hard enough, the fence gives 
way to judicial standards of “just cause.”  Japan now seeks to regulate 
criminal behavior through private contracts, but prosecutors exercise more 
discretion now than before in deciding not to prosecute.  Public law defines 
the conditions for a nuclear reactor to run, but those fences give way to a 
gentlemen’s agreement, and that gentlemen’s agreement depends on local 
government and local consensus.  Black letter norms give way to back door 
consensus.   
The analysis could stop here.  But there is another dimension to this 
discussion, and it relates to the actors.  Who defines these layers of the law?  
In each of these examples, they are institutional actors.  Businesses draft the 
detailed leases and work rules.  The national government implements 
comprehensive regulatory regimes governing use of nuclear power and 
attempts to reduce crime.  In each of these examples, detailed definitions 
give way to equitable or consensus-driven norms.  These equitable norms 
are also defined by institutional actors—the judiciary, or prosecutor’s office, 
or local government officials.   
What is missing from this picture is that individuals, not institutions, 
drive the process.  Individuals are the ones rattling the fences, pursuing an 
equitable resolution despite the language of the contract or the law, and they 
are increasingly willing to do so through the courts.  As depicted in 
Appendix B, the numbers of civil filings show an almost uninterrupted rise 
during the postwar period.
514
  In 1949, 41,086 civil actions were filed in 
district courts in Japan.
515
  By 2009, that number was over 259,000.
516
  The 
change in summary court claims is rarely discussed, but even more 
pronounced.  In 1949, claimants filed 5,197 suits.
517
  In 2009, claimants filed 
686,000.
518
  Recent statistics for all summary court filings, including those 
                                                     
514
 See Appendix B, infra.   
515
  Id. 
516
 Somusho Tōkeikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications, Statistics Bureau], Soshō 
Jiken Oyobi Chōtei Jiken no Shuruibestu Shinju/Kisai Jikensū (2004-2009), http://www.stat.go.jp/ 
data/nenkan/25.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  
517
  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Saibansho no Shinju Jikensu no Suii (1949-2002), 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/zinsokuka_kentoukai/01/sinzyu2.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2012). 
518
  Id.      
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for debt collection and conciliation, are down significantly.
519
  But the 
number of civil cases litigated in summary courts continues to rise.
520
  
Japanese individuals show an ever-increasing willingness to go to court over 
the small stuff.
521
   
In the public law realm, local consensus now comes with increasing 
citizen participation.  Administrative law claims have trended higher over 
the past two decades.
522
  A former Supreme Court justice describes the 
change in rights consciousness as “people’s eyes have opened,” and they no 
longer accept the government as an absolute.
523
  March 11 accelerated this.  
An “insidious legacy” of March 11 is “shaken trust” in the government.524   
This increasing willingness to file civil claims and decreasing 
willingness to trust the government combines with two important 
demographic trends also depicted in Appendix B.  The first relates to Japan’s 
population.  Scholars suggest that the “Japanese are disappearing in slow 
motion.”525  The U.N. projects that Japan’s 2010 population of 127 million 
will shrink by 20% by 2050.
526
  By 2075, Japan’s Statistics Bureau estimates 
a population of 68 million, about half the current population.
527
   
Compare that to a second important demographic trend: the increase 
in legal service providers.  In 1950, there were 5,827 attorneys in Japan.
528
  
                                                     
519
 The Supreme Court breaks summary court filings into four categories: civil suits, debt collection, 
conciliation, and other.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Dai 2-4 Minji/Gyōsei Jiken no Shinju Jiken no Saikin 5 
Nenkan no Suii, http://www.courts.go.jp/shiotokei/graph/pdf/B20No2-4.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).  
For the most recent period available, from 2004 through 2008, overall summary filings dropped almost 
27%, from 1,894,659 to 1,386,684; litigated cases increased over 35%, from 374,686 to 577,383.  Id.  
520
  Id. 
521
  Jurisdictional limits for summary court have changed over time.  They are currently ¥1,400,000 or 
approximately $17,500 at 80 yen to the dollar. See http://www.courts.go.jp/saiban/syurui_minzi/minzi_04_
02_05/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
522
  There were 1,191 administrative litigation cases recorded in 1990 rising to 2,915 in 2005.  
Numbers fell between 2006 and 2009, but increased again in 2010, the most recent year available, to 2,661.  
Somusho Tōkeikyoku, Soshō Jiken Oyobi Chōtei Jiken no Shuruibestu Shinju/Kisai Jikensū (2005-2010), 
available at http://www.stat.go.jp/data/nenkan/25.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2013); Somusho Tōkeikyoku, 
Soshō Jiken Oyobi Chōtei Jiken no Shuruibestu Shinju/Kisai Jikensū (2004-2009), supra note 523; 
Somusho Tōkeikyoku, Soshō Jiken Oyobi Chōtei Jiken no Shuruibestu Shinju/Kisai Jikensū (1985-2004), 
www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/zuhyou/28-15-b.xls (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).  See also Luke Nottage & 
Stephen Green, Who Defends Japan?: Government Lawyers and Judicial System Reform in Japan, 13 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 129, 137, 141-145, 171 (2011). 
523
  Interview with former Supreme Court Justice, in Tokyo (Apr. 19, 2012). 
524
  John M. Glionna, A cloud of distrust over Japan, THE DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 19, 2012, at 7. 
525
Michael Auslin, Japan’s Age of Denial, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/S
B10001424052970204301404577170023087570342.html. 
526
  Id. 
527
 Somusho Tōkeikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications, Statistics Bureau], Jinkō 
no Suii to Shōrai no Jinkō, http://www.stat.go.jp/data/nihon/02.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
528
 Nihon Bengōshi Rengōkai [Japanese Federation of Bar Associations], Bengōshi no Jissei Chart 1-
1, www.nichibenren.or.jp/library (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  
670 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 3 
 
In 2010, there were 28,789.
529
  Over the past two decades alone, attorney 
numbers have approximately doubled.
530
  Since the first group of law school 
graduates passed the new bar exam in 2006, attorney numbers have 
increased by approximately 1,700 per year.
531
  Setting aside the Judicial 
System Reform Council’s goal to admit 3,000 new attorneys per year and 
assuming increases similar to those since 2006,
532
 the population of 
attorneys will double again in the next two decades.  Even if policy changes 
and pass-rates decline, the attorney population will continue to increase as 
the general population decreases.  Over 30% of registered attorneys today 
have practiced less than five years, suggesting that most within this group 
are relatively young and likely to practice for the foreseeable future.
533
   
The number of judicial scriveners has increased as well, and the scope 
of services they provide grown.
534
  The Japan Federation of Judicial 
Scriveners reported 19,638 registered judicial scriveners for 2009, compared 
to 13,500 in 1989.
535
  The number of administrative scriveners has increased 
significantly.
536
  The Japan Federation of Administrative Scrivener 
Associations listed 42,328 registered administrative scriveners for 2011, 
compared to 16,000 in 1989.
537
  The number of students graduating with an 
undergraduate degree in law has declined in recent years, but continued to 
average over 40,000 per year over the past decade.
538
  Demographic trends 
suggest a rapidly declining general population and a rapidly increasing 
population of legal professionals. 
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675, 678 (1989). 
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  Nihon Gyōsei Shoshi Kai Rengōkai [Japanese Federation of Administrative Law Scrivener 
Associations], Tani Kaibestu Kaiinsū Ichiran, http://www.gyosei.or.jp/gyomu/index.html (last visited Mar. 
9, 2012).  
537
  Id.; Routh, supra note 542, at 678. 
538
  See Mombukagakusho [MEXT], Gakkō no Kihon Chōsa, http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/ 
NewList.do?tid=000001011528 (last visited March 9, 2012) (2006 numbers unavailable). 
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The numbers can’t help but influence the role that law plays in 
Japanese society.  One can no longer ride the trains without seeing 
advertisements for legal assistance.
539
  Judicial scriveners offer twenty-four 
hour hotlines to consult on debt restructuring.
540
  Japanese attorneys, once 
primarily denizens of the courtroom, now advertise for business writing 
wills and contracts.
541
  They will help probate estates, divide up assets after 
divorce or a death in the family, or help restructure debts.
542
  They will 
pursue pain and suffering (isharyō) claims following an auto accident and 
help with insurance and housing problems.
543
  They offer evening and 
weekend office hours, will respond for free to telephone and email inquiries, 
and offer payment plans “that won’t be a burden.”544   
 How does this tie into the layers of the law found in Japan?  
Bargaining in Japan happens first within the shadow of the contract and, if 
challenged, then within the shadow of the law and the “consensus of 
society.”  Absent challenge, the detailed lease controls, even if it conflicts 
with case law.  Absent challenge, the work rules prevail, even if they directly 
conflict with case law.  Unless ‘local consensus’ demands otherwise, public 
regulation controls.   
What happens if challenge comes cheaper?  There are more 
challenges to primary attempts at ordering.  There is greater reliance on the 
courts, which apply equitable principles.  There are more challenges to and 
through local governments, which seek to craft local consensus.  Even as 
Japanese law grows more complex and legal rights and obligations are 
defined in greater detail, challenges to those defined rights and obligations 
will continue.  Secondary layers of the law, Professor Kawashima’s “rights 
that exist but don’t exist”—will remain important.  Understanding the role of  
primary ordering, based on detailed rights and obligations, and secondary 
ordering, based equity and the “consensus” of society, is fundamental to 
understanding the role that law plays in the Japan of today and will play in 
the Japan of tomorrow. 
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  Photos of advertisements on file with author. 
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  Id. 
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  Id.  
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  Id.   
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545
 Charts based on Cabinet Office, Jikomae no Waga Kuno no Genshiryoku Anzen Kisei nado no 
Wakugumi, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/topics/2011/pdf/02-shikumi.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); 
Mombukagaskusho [MEXT], Genshiryoku/Hōshasen Anzen Kakuho; Kantei [Cabinet Office], Genshiryoku 
Kisei no Tame no Atarashii Taisei Ni Tsuite, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/genshiryokukisei.html 
(last visited July 31, 2012).  
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546
  Charts based on Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Saibansho no Shinju Jikensu no Suii, supra note 517; 
Somusho Tōkeikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications, Statistics Bureau], Jinkō no Suii to 
Shōrai no Jinkō, supra note 530, at 2-1; Nihon Bengōshi Rengōkai [Japanese Federation of Bar 
Associations], Hōsō Jinkō Seisaku ni Kan Suru Kinkyu Teigen, supra note 533 at 1; Nikkei Guro-karu 
[Nikkei Global], De-ta de Miru Chiiki—Bengōshi  to Shihō Shoshi no Zōkaritsu, NIKKEI GURO-KARU No. 
115 (Jan. 5, 2009) available at www.nikkei-rim.net/glocal/glocal_pdf/115PDF/115data.pdf.  
